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Who Is Guilty? 

AUTHENTICAL REVELAflONS 
from 

The Belgian Archives 

regarding 

OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE 

LIGHT OF PRESENT TIMES AND 

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 



PRICE 50 CENTS 



An e^e-opener for many fairminded Jlmericans 
NEW YORK, 1920 



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the truth. 



Who Is Guilty? 

AUTHENTICAL REVELATIONS 
from 

The Belgian Archives 

regarding 

OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE 

LIGHT OF PRESENT TIMES AND 

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 



PRICE 50 CENTS 



An e^e-opener for many fair minded jimericans 
NEW YORK, 1920 



0^ 



AUG 20 ' 



Important — Read This 

FOREWORD 

The object of the presentation of a series of abstracts from official letters 
in regard to the activities of England, France and Russia which eventually 
culminated in the World's War, is the desire of correcting the horrible mis- 
representations, controversies and falsehoods which alone were permitted circula- 
tion in our own and other countries and to inform the real, true and intelligently 
thinking men and women of the indecent methods by which they have been 
hoodwinked from the beginning to the end of that war. Nor is that the only 
object, for it must be drawn into consideration that by these same methods 
nearly twenty-six millions of loyal citizens have been made to suffer in mind 
and body, not considering the shameful robbery under the plausible title of 
confiscation of over six and one-half billions of dollars of property. These 
crimes, which have been perpetrated upon these citizens, who are either German- 
born or of German parentage, and who have been the chief factors in the building 
of these United States are really too appalling, and the fiendish methods intro- 
ducing the character of themselves and the endeavor to besmirch even their 
unborn descendants is too heinous to be true. 

It must be admitted that only by such methods was it possible to accomplish 
the participation in the European war. Only by the shouting of liberty and 
Democracy was it possible to induce thousands upon thousands, nay, millions of 
Americans, to lend themselves in carrying out the sinister plot of crushing Germany, 
the birthplace of millions of the best citizens these United States ever had or ever 
will have. All the malignant persecutions to which these have been subjected have 
been devilishly encompassed by various pretexts and were made possible by the in- 
famous scheme of isolation conceived and fostered by Edward VII of England and 
Declasse of France. When the machinations and preparations by the "Entente 
cordiale" were finally completed and Russia had succeeded by the instigation 
of the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria and wife in forcing Austria to 
arise with the demand for the punishment of the murderers and compel Germany 
to demand of Russia an explanation for the massing of her troops on Germany's 
eastern boundary, the furies of war were turned loose. The very first step in 
the scheme of isolation put into operation was to deprive Germany of all means 
of outside communication by cutting the trans-oceanic cables. This was done 
not so much for the sake of defense as it was to deprive Germany and the 
German people of the means of preventing the infamous propaganda of besmirch- 
ing the character of all people of German origin, no matter where on the globe 
they might be living. The devilish inventions of German barbarism committing 
the Belgian atrocities, of which up to this day not a single one has been found 
to exist, of which there will never be found any, because none were committed, 
at least, not by the Germans or Austrians, could be exploited to the fullest extent 
and without the danger of having these lies for which a sufficiently qualifying 
adjective cannot be found in American language, exposed and contradicted. 
No one hearing of the blood-curdling and unspeakable atrocities, and made to 
believe them, could help to cry out horror stricken: Punish the fiends; crush 



them out of existence. So plausibly were these lies fed to the people of this 
and other countries, that even citizens of this country of German extraction 
were momentarily stunned into believing them. It was not until the reports of 
American correspondents, etc., which had made it an object of special investiga- 
tions of learning the extent of these atrocities, had without hesitation pronounced 
them falsehoods, that they recovered their nearly lost or destroyed faith in 
the character of their forbears. Should the fundamental plan of England have 
turned out as she had intended and conceived it, and Germany simultaneously 
attacked from all sides, should have been overrun by the Russian and French 
armies, what indeed, would have become of the German women and children? 
But then the world's sentiment would have been a different one, and England 
would have found herself exposed in all of her iniquity in having drawn the 
other nations into a conflict for no other reasons than her envy and jealousy 
of her competitor in the worlds markets. As, however, events did not shape 
themselves from the start in such directions she must, of necessity resort to about 
the vilest means which human minds inflamed with jealousy, envy and hatred, 
could possibly conceive. She, therefore, started at once upon this slanderous 
propaganda and thus succeeded in producing a sentiment of hatred which quickly 
extended to people of German ancestry in this country. Then, now and for 
all future to come, it must have been and should forever be incredible that an 
American newspaper, the New York Sun, could have published the statement 
that "the Germans are not human beings in the common acceptation of the term." 

There will be very litde doubt in the minds of honorable and just citizens 
of these United States to measure the writer, and through him, the paper as 
well, according to their true standards. Since this statement reflected upon the 
character of twenty-six per cent of the white population of the whole country, 
it certainly was up to the administration, with a Woodrow Wilson at the head, 
not only to punish the infamous writer but also to stop the avalanche of reports 
of the Belgian atrocities which were poured into the State Department at Wash- 
ington by the British Government. 

From the book of Frederick Franklin Schrader. formerly Secretary Repub- 
lican Congressional Committee, and author of Republican Campaign Textbook, 
1898, is taken the following quotation from Shrader's book, "1683-1920," being 
extracts from an address before the Commercial Club of St. Louis, early in 
1918, by Melville E. Stone. The address was reported in the St. Louis 
Clobe-Democrat of March 25, 1918. Melville E. Stone, General Manager 
of the Associated Press, among other things made the following statements: 
"One of the many rumors which I have investigated since the beginning of 
the war is that 'the hands of the Belgian children have been cut off'. This 
is not the truth, aside from all other proof, a child whose hands had been cut 
off would have died if not given immediate attention; any surgeon or physician 
will bear me out in this. I have investigated forty or fifty such stories, and in 
every case have found them untrue." 

B. N. Langdon, an English man, speaking at Madison, Wisconsin, as 
reported under date of December 5, 1919, said among other things: "That the 
public had been fed on a great deal of misinformation, and that most of the 
German atrocities were manufactured by Allied press agents for the purpose 
of stitrring up hate." 

In this foreword it would be too tedious to present all the authoritative 
evidence and proofs of the manufacture of these lies and it is up to every 
fair-minded American to obtain the long list from Schraders "1863-1920." 



Ejiough has been said of this phase of the Anti-German propaganda, and 
attention can now be given to the second one: "That Germany, successful 
in defeating her European enemies, would next turn her arms to an attack upon 
the United States. An unreasoning and inflamed populace lent again a believing 
ear to this unutterably stupid and brainless story, which is disproven by the fact 
up to this day even Germany never accepted the declaration of war by the 
United States of America. She merely fought the American troops as a con- 
tingent of the entente cordiale." 

The third invention in line of the propaganda which, as every man, woman 
and child of the present time knows, and which beyond all measure of doubt 
will be execrated by all future generations, had its origin not in England, was 
the cry for liberty for all peoples of the globe oppressed by despotic monarchism 
and militarism. This child of a deceased brain was to the already inflamed 
people of this country the main lever by which the administration succeeded 
in mobilizing the whole nation into the fanatic war attitude of the period begin- 
ning on April 6, 1917. 

The history of the World's War as it will surely be written by honest 
and conscientious historians and true patriots of this and other countries, will 
truly be a revelation as well as the blackest blotch of iniquity for all time to 
come. 

As a tithe of contribution to the endeavors of re-establishing not only the 
character of an entire nation but also that of more than one-fourth of the popula- 
tion of our country, the following abstracts are offered in explanation of the 
situations as they have been created, which preceded the outbreak of the war. 

The letters themselves are the official reports of the Belgian ambassadors 
and other representatives of that Kingdom in Berlin, London and Paris, and 
were recovered by the Germans from the Belgian archives. These letters reveal 
step by step the Isolation Scheme, the forging of the "Entente Cordiale," and 
above all the endeavor of the Belgian statesmen to keep their own country from 
becoming enmeshed in the English-French-Russian intrigues. 

The letters are absolutely authentic and even the Allies themselves have 
made little or no attempt to discredit or deny them, but preferred to put these 
unwelcome and dangerous revelations into oblivion by studied inattention and 
silence. They are now presented in translation in a very much abridged form, 
and only the most pregnant sentences in the majority of them have been rendered 
verbatim, some few which are deemed too essential in their entirety are re- 
produced in full. 

They are numbered in chronological sequence, and since all of them are 
addressed to the same high official, the address as well as the conclusions have 
been omitted and only the signatures of the correspondents are attached to each 
communication. 

May these evidences, the products of thoroughly trained and keenly dis- 
cerning minds as those of Greindl, Lalaing, Leghait and others, help in the 
just cause of giving the lie to the traducers of Germany and the German 
character throughout our own adopted fatherland and the world over. 

JUSTITIA PUBLISHING CO. 



No. 1 
Count Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador in London, to Baron Favereau. 

London, Feb. 7, 1905. 

The enmity of the English public toward the German people is 
already fairly old. It is based, so it appears, upon envy and fear. 
The envy in regard to the economic and commercial policies of Ger- 
many; the fear, in the contemplation, that the maritime supremacy, 
the only one which England could claim for herself, might perhaps 
be contented one of these days by the German fleet. These repre- 
sentations are also being nourished by the English press, regardless 
of any international complications, and any side-thrust upon the am- 
bitious Emperor and the secret machinations of his chancellor un- 
failingly finds the applause of the masses. 

At a banquet last week the civil lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. 
Lee, praised the recently introduced reforms of the Government, which 
permitted to strike the first blow before the enemy could be pre- 
pared; nay, even before war had been declared. He added that the 
vigilance of the Admiralty should be chiefly extended upon the North 
Sea. This language has aroused considerable excitement in Germany. 
Attempts are being made, therefore, to patch up the rent, and it is 
asserted here that the speech of Mr. Lee has been misconstrued. 

LALAING. 

No. 2 
Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, to Baron Favereau. 

Berlin, Feb. 18, 1905. 

For this reason I have not yet reported on the interview of the 
English journalist, Bashford, with the Chancellor, notwithstanding 
the sensation which it produced when published three months ago. 
As Count Buelow had informed the English people already that Ger- 
many had no aggressive intentions toward England, he said nothing 
which was not already known to any calm critic. 

The real cause of the hatred of the English toward Germany 
is jealousy, brought about by the extraordinary rapid development 
of the German Commercial Fleet, the German commerce and the 
German industry. This hatred will last as long as it will take the 
English to familiarize themselves with the idea that the world's 
commerce is not a monopoly which belongs by rights to England 
alone. Besides, this hatred is carefully nourished by the "Times" 
and a number of newspapers and magazines which do not shrink from 
calumnies in order to cater to the taste of their readers. One of the 
chief reasons for the recently formed understanding between France 
and England, which, in my opinion, has not found as yet a sufficient 
explanation, has surely been the desire of obtaining a free hand against 
Germany. 

Whatever may have been the secret motive of the English min- 
isters, they have always been ostensibly correct. It was clear that 
the re-organization of the English fleet was directed against Germany. 
Under Secretary of State Von Muehlberg told me the Emperor had 



spoken of the strictures of Mr. Lee in very earnest tones to the Eng- 
lish Ambassador in Berlin. Mr. Lee has in the meantime publicly 
corrected the quotation of his address by a improvement of those 
passages which had been irritating to Germany. It appears, however, 
that very little credit is accorded here to this dementi. 

No. 3 

Count Lalaing. 

London, April 1, 1905. 

As you know, the German Emperor is not popular in England, 
and especially not since the dispatch of his telegram to President 
Krueger in January, 1896, and you know of the little sympathy which 
this people has for Germany. The visit of the Emperor to Tangier 
has not failed to evoke unfriendly articles by the press, which was 
happy over the opportunity of pouring out its ill-will toward the 
regent of a country, which is a commercial competitor of England's, 
which intends to create a war fleet of the first rank and which, at 
present, encourages the Moroccans in their mighty resistance against 
the undertakings of France. 

It is feared that Germany will insist upon the maintenance of 
the open door in Tangier, will stand by for the independence of the 
Sultanate and so prevent the policy of "friendly absorption" under- 
taken by France and approved bv England. 

LALAING. 

No. 4 

Paris, May 7, 1905. 
In this letter. Monsieur Leghait reports the presence of the King 
of England in Paris at a moment when the tension caused by the 
events in Tangier still exists, and states that while this visit may 
have considerable significance the latter should not be exaggerated. 
He continues, however: The silence, which Germany persistently 
maintains, notwithstanding Monsieur Delcasse's request of dispelling 
all misunderstanding by open speech, does not permit to let the pre- 
vailing nervousness here subside, and the question is when and how 
one might escape from the false situation in which one finds oneself. 
Monsieur Delcasse yesterday received Prince Radolin in audience; 
he regaled him with all sorts of amiable platitudes, but never once 
touched upon the Moroccan question, etc., etc. 

A. LEGHAIT. 

No. 5 

Count Lalaing. 

London, June 8, 1905. 
The news of Delcasse's resignation has been received with regret 
by the press organs of the British Government. The friendly policy 
of the former Minister of Foreign Afifairs toward England and who 
had been so strangely supported by the French Ambassador in Lon- 
don had led to an entente whose full value had been proven by recent 
events, etc., etc. 

LALAING. 

8 



No. 6 
Count Ursel, Belgian Charge d'AflFaires in Berlin. 

Berlin, Aug. 5, 1905. 
The English permit no endangering of their commerce or their 
sea power. The gigantic advances of Germany signify for England 
a constant menace, and England hesitates at no measure to restrict 
this expansion. The recent meeting between the German Emperor 
and the Czar, the visit of Emperor William to Copenhagen, the pres- 
ence of German warships in Danish waters, have given to the Eng- 
lish press a pretense of indulging in accusations and insults against 
Germany. Wherever England can create difificuhies for Germany she, 
embraces such an opportunity immediately. 

URSEL. 

No. 7 
Count Ursel. 

Berlin, Aug. 22, 1905. 

Count Ursel refers to the alarm which a few German newspapers 
had indulged in spreading when it was mooted that an English naval 
division was to hold its maneuvres in the Baltic, but also notifies 
Count Favereau that the Government had officially explained the 
matter and that international courtesy demanded a friendly reception 
of the English warships. 

URSEL. 

No. 8 
Baron Greindl. 

Berlin, Sept. 23, 1905. 

For years English newspapers, headed by the "National Review," 
have maintained a campaign in favor of an English-Russian rapproach- 
ment. 

Upon conclusion of the English-French Treaty, French diplomacy 
is industriously engaged in the same direction. Rumors are circu- 
lating now that the negotiations were being continued, and there 
are certain indications on the strength of which, I believe, that special 
attention should be given to them. As I hear, the contemplation of 
a Russian loan in England is no longer dismissed off-handedly in 
the ranks of London's high, finance. Up to quite recently the Eng- 
lish bankers positively refused to even entertain such a possibility. 

Yesterday I asked Baron Von Richthofeu what was to be thought 
of these rumors. He replied that there was surely nothing special 
in the high and highest circles in England in favor of a movement 
of a rapproachment toward Russia. I interrupted Baron Richthofeu 
and said that it was suspected, indeed, that the King of England 
entertained such a plan and that lie had even spoken with the Em- 
peror about it during their recent meeting. The Secretary of State 
did not contradict it. 

In the further course of the conversation, Baron von Richthofeu 
then expressed the opinion that, notwithstanding Delcasse's downfall, 
there existed a strong party in France which intended to continue 



the policy of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Finally the 
enmity against Germany did play a heavy role in all those combina- 
tions. But the Secretary of State did not believe, however, that the 
dangers were very great. The foundations for an entente between 
England and Russia were lacking. It would be contradictory to the 
agreement which had been concluded on August 12th between Eng- 
land and Japan. Against whom could this agreement after all be 
directed unless it be against the Czar's empire? The plan of an Eng- 
lish Russian entente did not fit into the frame of the German friendly 
speech which Witte had just then made in Paris. The Russian Prime 
Minister would return to St. Petersburg and would, undoubtedly, 
have a word to say there. If there was to be an understanding be- 
tween England and Russia, Witte certainly would also have gone to 
London. 

From our standpoint it would be desirable if the Secretary of 
State continued to be right in his surmise. The Triple Alliance led 
by Germany has presented us with thirty years of peace in Europe. 
Right now it is weakened by the state of dissolution in which Aus- 
tria-Hungary finds herself. The new French-English-Russian Triple 
Entente would be no substitution, to the contrary, it would be a cause 
of a lasting disquietude. This feeling is here so strongly imprinted 
that the ELmperor believed an attack from France supported by Eng- 
land to be closely imminent as soon as it became known at the begin- 
ning of last year that Paris and London were industriously negotiat- 
ing without the object of these negotiatons being clearly understood. 

The really very bad personal relations between the Emperor and 
King of England are no secret to anybody. 

The new distribution of the English naval powers is, undoubtedly, 
aimed at Germany. Whoever still doubted this would have had his 
eyes opened by the unwise speech of Lee's, the Civil Lord of the 
.\dmiralty. 

When the British fleet selected the Baltic Sea as a show place 
for her maneuvres, the British Government ostenibly only exercised 
its right. It would have been unwise on the part of Germany to 
have felt insulted thereby, and indeed, she prepared the most amicable 
reception conceivable for the English sailors. Notwithstanding all 
this, the visit of the fleet signified a demonstration : the enormously 
numeric preponderance of the English naval strength should be held 
tangibly before the eyes of the German people. The usual telegram 
of the English admiral to the Emperor was couched in frozen tones, 
and his Majesty replied in the same manner. 

The gigantic efforts of the English press to prevent a peaceable 
conclusion of the Moroccan affair and the insincere credulity with 
which it receives all calumnies against the German policies prove 
how ready public opinion in Great Britain is to embrace every com- 
bination inimical to Germany. 

However, the main point of dissension between England and 
Russia has been eliminated ; that is, the unwholesome ambition of 
Russia to extend unceasingly the boundaries of her already far too 
large empire. The military defeats of Russia and her internal com- 
plications will force her for a long time to come, to relinquish the 
policy of conquest. 

10 



Political constellations do not last forever. Perhaps a regroup- 
ing of the Great Powers, is already in preparation which may lessen 
European security, and, thereby turn to our own disadvantage. 

GREINDL. 
No. 9 
Abstract of Baron Greindl's Letter of Sept. 30, 1905. 

In this letter Baron Greindl after mentioning in general Russia's 
inability to participate in any warlike undertaking for at least the 
next ten years to come, expresses himself to this extent : "The tone in 
which the press campaign in England is generally pitched makes it 
recognizable that the approachment to Russia is not desired so much 
for the purpose of relieving tension but for inimical motives against 
Germany. Unfortunately the King of England may have this view 
also." 

GREINDL. 

No. 10 

October 14, 1905. 
Baron Greindl. 

You will recall, Baron, that von Richthofen had told me on Sep- 
tember 23 that he did not believe in any Russian-English entente, 
because there was no reason for such. Notwithstanding, a possible 
basis for it is present. England does not interest herself any longer 
in the fate of Turkey, the maintenance of which had been for so long 
the great principle of her policy. It might give Russia a free hand 
in Asia Minor. In her ideas such a combination might have the ad- 
vantage besides of muddling the relations between Russia and Ger- 
many and the isolation of Germany is momentarily the direct aim 
of the English policy. 

GREINDL. 

No. 11 

Paris, October 24, 1905. 
H. Leghait. """' 

Notwithstanding all efforts to maintain her supremacy and to 
down the development of her great Germanic competitor, England 
apparently desires, anyhow, to escape a conflict, but will her selfish 
motives not bring us directly into war? The German complaints 
are directed against the French Government but in reality are aimed 
at Great Britain. It must be perfectly clear to France, that if Del- 
casse's policy is continued, she will one of these days bear the costs 
of a war, thefruits of which will fall to England. 

■^ '^ " LEGHAIT. 

No. 12 

Berlin, October 27, 1905. 
Baron Greindl. 

The monument of Field Marshall Count Moltke was unveiled yes- 
terday in Berlin. At the gala dinner his Majesty explained that this 
day demanded two toasts, one to the past and remembrance. Filled 
with deep appreciation of the Providence which gave a great emperor 
at a great time his Paladine. his Majesty offered his first and silent 

11 



toast to the memory of the greatest field marshal of Emperor William. 
His Majesty continued : "The second glass is to the future and 
the present. You have seen, gentlemen, what the position of Ger- 
many is in the world; therefore, keep the powder dry; the sword 
sharp, the aim recognized, the strength on the alert, and the pessimist 
banished. I raise my glass to our people in arms. The German 
Army and its General Staflf ! Hurrah ! Hurrah ! Hurrah !" 

Notwitstanding all official attempts at denial, it could not be 
plainer expressed that the Emperor now as ever believes that the 
^JEnglish policy in Paris, Tokio, St. Petersburg and Washington, was 
not for the improvement of relations to European and extra Euro- 
pean powers, which, by the way, would be perfectly justifiable — but 
the isolation of Germany. 

Here an unconquerable distrust prevails against England. A 
great many Germans are convinced that England is seeking allies for 
an attack upon Germany, or — and it would correspond much more to 
British tradition — that she is working at bringing about a war on the 
continent in which she would not participate herself but the fruits 
of which she would harvest. I am told a great many Englishmen 
harbor similar anticipations and fear a German attack. 

I only ask myself upon what such impressions could be founded 
in London. Germany is absolutely unable to attack England. She 
would have to control the sea at least for a few days, in order to land 
an army on the English coast, and for that Germany has no chance. 
She might be able to transport her fleet hidden in both exits of 
the Emperor William's Canal, during a night from sea to sea and to 
prevent a blockade of German ports. Germany might have in such 
a manner a chance of attacking an inimical flotilla at a favorable 
moment, but only with a tired-out crew and used-up machines. Only 
for such a purpose has the German fleet been built ; and she would 
be unable to engage in naval battle alongside the English coast. The 
relation of numerical strength is too unequal. 

To exploit the possibility of a German attack upon the English 
colonies is superfluous, because, evidently, it is not to be thought of 
at all. 

Are the people, who in England make so much to do about an 
utterly impossible German attack, entirely sincere? Are they not 
merely pretending such grievances perhaps for the purpose of in- 
flaming a war in which the German war fleet would be annihilated,, 
the German commercial fleet and the German maritime commerce 
would be destroyed ? England is safeguarded ; Germany, on the other 
hand, is easily hit. If England one of these days attacks Germany 
to get rid of a rival, she would thereby merely follow out her ancient 
methods. She has destroyed in sequence : the Dutch fleet with the 
connivance of Louis XIV., thereupon the French fleet, the Danish 
fleet, the latter in the midst of peace and without reason, only because 
she represented an appreciable power at sea. 

Between Germany and England there exists no reasonable foun- 
dation for a war. The English hatred against Germany arises solely 
and alone from the envy which the development of the German Navy, 
the German commerce and German industry called forth. 

GREINDL. 
12 



No. 13 

Berlin, November 18, 1905. 

The "Rekhsanzeiger" published yesterday the following- abstract 
from the budget for the coming year, which contains the expenditures 
for the Navy. 

The Government proposes etc., etc. The plan shall go into effect 
within nine years. In its essentials it was already known before 
the publication of the details, and has now been received very favor- 
ably by the public opinion. This circumstance is the more remark- 
able as the financial situation of the Empire is not at all satisfactory. 

The Navy was formerly very unpopular in Germany. A rever- 
sion in its favor began after the Boer War (and the war about Cuba), 
which German public opinion regarded as robberies ; it desired to see 
the Empire safeguarded against similar attacks. The new organiza- 
tion of the British naval powers, which, undoubtedly, are directed 
against Germany, have made the necessity of possessing a fleet more 
apparent not for the purpose of attacking England — a thought which 
is not entertained here by anybody and which would be_ impossible, 
anyhow — but solely and alone for the defense against England. 

On the Continent, Germany is only exposed to an attack by 
France or Russia. In the event of a conflict with those powers, the 
outcome of the war would be decided by the army, and a naval battle, 
no matter in whose favor it would terminate, would have no influence 
upon the peace conditions. Germany, therefore, only has to fear Eng- 
land. England alone necessitates the maintenance of a war fleet which 
exceeds in size the measure which the protection of her commercial 
interests in foreign countries demands. 

Unfortunately, not only is the attitude of the English press but 
also that of the English ministers, adapted to nourish this distrust. 

Notwitstanding the official denials, nobody doubts here that the 
aggressive policy of Mr. Delcasse has been instigated by England. 

I am asking myself where and when has Germany crossed the 
English politics? Is it the recollection of the telegram which Em- 
peror William dispatched to President Krueger after the capture of 
Jameson and his colleagues? That seems too long ago. Besides, one 
should not forget in London that at that time it concerned a band of 
free hooters, which while organized under the hand of the English 
Government, was, nevertheless, officially disavowed by England. 

GREINDL. 

No. 14 

Berlin, December 31, 1905. 
Baron von Richthofen spoke to me yesterday with satisfaction of 
the ministerial change in London. The Secretary of State does not 
believe that a pre-conceived plan to break with Germany existed in 
London. He thought, however, that the French had recently shown 
a nervousness which was not justified by anything. One seemed to 
imagine in Paris that Germany was merely waiting for an opportunity 
to fall upon France. Germany would only make war if she was 
forced to it, she had never, even in the remotest, thought of provoking 

13 



a war. What would Germany gain by it? The whole of German 
policy proved Germany's peaceful intentions. She had not made the 
least effort of gaining by the internal unrest in Russia. I asked the 
Secretary whether I should regard as authentic the conversation be- 
tween the Emperor and a Frenchman reported three days ago in the 
"Temps"? In the main the Emperor is accredited of having stated 
that he was wrongly believed of being surrounded by a war party ; 
even if such existed it would still be of no importance as the decision 
between war and peace was resting with him. The Emperor did not 
want any war, as it would be in direct opposition to his duties toward 
God and his people. Baron von Richthofen replied that the state- 
ment in the "Temps" had been correct, if not in form, but in text. 
He added that the Emperor had made such remarks to the French 
military attache in Berlin, the Marquis de Laguiche. Otherwise 
these Avere the well-known thoughts of his Majesty. 

I replied that it appeared to me that it was possible to character- 
ize the policy of the Emperor in the following words : The highest 
ambition of his Majesty is the maintenance of peace during the dura- 
tion of his reign. The Secretary of State replied that that, indeed, 
was the chief motif of the Emperor's policy. 

GREINDL. 

No. 15 

London, January 14, 1906. 
Letter of Mr. E. Von Grootvan, Belgian Charge d' Affairs in London. 

In it he refers to the impending conference in Algeciras and 
speculates as to the intentions of the powers most concerned, Ger- 
many and France. He states that England was on the side of France 
and that she had entered into obligations with France which she 
would have to fulfill, even in the case of a German-French war and 
all other dangers. 

VON GROOTVEN. 

No. 16 

Paris. March 6, 1906. 
H. Leghait. 

King Edward the VII. arrived in Paris Saturday evening and 
stopped at the English Embassy. Although his Majesty desired to 
preserve his incognito, the circumstances of his presence in Paris 
and the meetings which he had are of special significance. The King 
exchanged calls with the President of the Republic and invited him 
to dinner on Sunday at the Embassy. Furthermore, he had at lun- 
cheon yesterday Messrs. Loubat and Delcasse. This attention to 
Mons. Delcasse just at this present moment is much discussed. One 
sees in it, in general, a significant notice, which has, on account of its 
possibly far-reaching and extremely weighty consequences, produced 
uneasiness. 

Naturally the King of England desired to give to that minister, 
who made the English opinions with so much zeal his own, a special 
sign of appreciation of his sympathy; but on account of the fact that 

14 



he called to himself the very man whose retirement Germany had 
demanded, he has added to the agreement of April 8, 1904, a new sig- 
nificance and has solemnly approved of a policy against which Ger- 
many protested and which even France herself had refused to enter- 
tain. If there could have existed any doubts still about Great Britain's 
intentions, they are now dispelled. 

The King has wanted to show, so it seems, that the policy which 
the energetic intervention of Germany had called forth has. notwith- 
standing remained the same because England adheres firmly and un- 
shaken to the principles of the agreement of April 8, 1904. This dem- 
onstration is considered in diplomatic circles as unnecessary, and at 
this moment as extremely dangerous, for one believes himself drawn 
against his will, into English politics, the consequences of which one 
fears, and which, generally, had been disapproved after the expose of 
Delcasse. The long and short of it is, that one sees in it with appre- 
hension an indication of the efforts of England to poison the situation 
to such an extent that war becomes inevitable. 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 17 

Berlin, April 5, 1906. 
Baron Greindl. 

The movement in favor of an approachment toward Germany 
called forth by Lord Avebury has remained without results. The 
English press has done its utmost in preventing satisfactory conclu- 
sions of the conference at Algeciras. It has shown itself less amenable 
than the French newspapers and has never ceased one moment to dis- 
seminate German plans of aggression which have never existed. Ap- 
parently the English ambassador in Algeciras made no eiTorts what- 
ever to find a solution equally satisfactory to France and Germany. 

There is no more doubt that it was the King of England who 
independently of his government has driven Delcasse into a war- 
like policy and has given him the anyhow impossible promise of 
landing 100,000 English soldiers in Holstein. 

The invitation of the King to Monsieur Delcasse during his so- 
journ in Paris can only be considered as a challenge. 

If there could have existed still any doubts whatsoever, the re- 
markable demarche of Col. Bernardiston (English Col.) by General 
Ducarne (Belgian Chief of Stafif) would have destroyed them. 

GREINDL. 

No. 18 

London, June 23. 1906. 
Count Lalaing. 

After stating the efforts which a close circle of English people, 
headed by Lord Avebury, had made with the intention of bringing 
about a more friendly attitude on the part of the English people to- 
ward Germany, Count Lalaing summed up the following conclusions : 

The actual results of these efforts are just about naught. The 
public opinion stands now firm. The English press has carried on 
such a missuse by its attacks upon the Emperor, his government and 

15 



his people, that the public remains distrustful. Germany is the great 
commercial, military and perhaps, also, future maritime competitor, 
therefore, every good citizen believes himself obligated to hate that 
country, because he tells himself that it is at the moment the only 
country which, since the awakening of Russia and the Entente with 
France, he has to fear. 

LALAING. 

No. 19 

Berlin, July 16, 1906. 
Baron Greindl. 

The reason for the strained English-German relations must not 
be sought in the personal feelings of the rulers but in the attitude of 
public opinions of the both countries. This public sentiment also 
guides the policy of the British Government which has remained just 
as inimical to Germany under the liberal party as under the unionistic 
one. What could the English possibly have to fear at the hands of 
Russia in her present state of unrest. It can readily be conceived 
what Russia could gain by England's friendship, but it is much less 
clear how Russian friendship could serve England. What else can 
London really want excepting to create enemies for Germany? Ac- 
cording to the "Morning Post," England and Russia have a plan for 
an entente for the purpose of sanctioning the building of the railroad 
in Mesopotamia with the condition that Russia should connect her 
Caucasus line and that England should have the control of the line 
from Bagdad to the Gulf of Persia. Such an agreement, should it 
be effected, would be the climax of all shamelessness. The Sultan 
is an independent ruler; he gave the concession for a railroad through 
Mesopotamia to a German bank. No foreign power has the right or 
could even offer the least pretense of meddling with these exclusively 
internal affairs of Turkey. Notwitstanding this plan exists and Lord 
Lansdowne recently declared in the Upper House that he had in 
1903 ineffectually endeavored to internationalize the Bagdad Rail- 
road, and from the beginning England has endeavored to place all 
of obstacles in the way of this undertaking. 

When the German bank obtained the concession seven years ago, 
it offered France and England participation, not because it needed 
foreign capital for the undertaking — and it is in a position to carry 
out the project unaided — but to avoid petty international jealousies, 
etc., etc. It is very much to be feared that with or without the peri- 
odic reconciliations, toward which we are dulled now, jealousy and 
mistrust will become the normal condition of the relations between 
England and Germany. 

GREINDL. 

No. 20 

After mentioning the proposed restrictions for army and navy 
expenditures, Count Lalaing states that England would want to pose 
before the second peace conference at the Hague in January, 1907, as 
favorably inclined to partial disarmament on account of the proposed 

16 



curtailment of the navy. He continues: But in order to bring ac- 
ceptance of this plan, the Minister of the Marine was obliged to make 
the explanation that in the event of a sanction of his program, the 
seapower of Great Britain was still far greater than that of the two 
other greatest navies in the world and that England would anyhow be 
without a competitor on the seas. England's magnanimous initiative 
by way of reformation looses considerably in value by the fact that she 
runs no danger, and that now as ever she intends to rule the ocean. 
Should the United States or above all Germany refuse at the 
Hague Conference to share the English aspect, England will not fail 
in placing the responsibility for the miscarriage of her humane ideas 
and those of her new apostle of peace. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman 
upon the shoulders of those nations. 

COUNT LALAING. 

No. 21. 

Paris, Feb. 4, 1907. 
H. Leghait. 

In this letter M. Leghait announces the arrival of the King and 
Queen of England in Paris and states that the voyage had been un- 
expected and even caused surprise to the French Government. He 
continues : Since recently there exists here an as yet silent and hesi- 
tating, but nevertheless, very significant opposition against the hood- 
winking with which one permits oneself to be drawn into the policies 
of England. The propositions and intentions of this Power do not 
appear any more as unselfish as they did in the beginning. In conse- 
quence, thereof, a party is forming which wants to shake off the yoke 
of this foreign influence in order to give France a greater and more 
honorable freedom of commerce, without, of course, relinquishing the 
otherwise friendly relations. I have grounds for the assumption that 
the English endeavors in Africa and, especially, in the Congo, has 
produced this feeling of distrust which shows itself here." Etc., etc. 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 22. 

London, Feb. 8. 1907. 
Count Lalaing. 

Count Lalaing describes the anger with which the English re- 
ceived the news that all parties in Germany at the last elections, with 
the exception of the Socialists, had strongly supported the Emperor 
and his policies. Many of the Socialists even went over to the other 
parties. Count Lalaing continues : That the Emperor continued to 
enjoy such a popularity was a revelation to the English which nour- 
ished the belief — zealously fed by the press — that the Emperor was 
little loved, had lost the people's confidence, and, therefore was to be 
feared very little. 

However that may be, public opinion has been badly disappointed 
by the results of the election, and the fear and the jealousy and the 
anti-German sentiment has not abated. 

LALAING. 

17 



No. 23. 

Berlin, Feb. 9, 1907. 

Baron Greindl's letter is herewith produced in full: 

"To my great astonishment I have perceived that earnest foreign 
newspapers have attributed a warlike significance to the short speech 
which the Emperor made to a concourse of the people on the night 
of Feb. 5. I have had the honor of transmitting to you in my report 
of day before yesterday the text of this address. No man here has 
thought of interpreting the words of his Majesty in the nature of a 
menace to the other Powers. One knows too well the usual manner 
of expression of the Emperor to misunderstand the extent of his 
speeches. One must also not doubt the peaceful intentions of his 
Majesty; he has demonstrated it sufficiently during his eighteen years 
of reign. 

It appears to me that one should know elsewhere, upon what one 
may depend; therefore, I ask myself: Is this exhibition of excitement 
sincere? Should it not be rather a continuation of this campaign of 
calumny which has been carried on for years in the press of Paris, 
London and St. Petersburg and by which the "Temps," the official 
organ of the French Ministry, has distinguished itself during the 
last few weeks? 

GREINDL. 

No. 24. 

Paris, Feb. 10, 1907. 
A. Leghait. 

In this letter M. Leghait discusses the presence of the English 
King and Queen and the hidden object of their visit. Two pregnant 
passages are quoted verbatim. 

"It is useless to attempt to deny that these tactics which ostensi- 
bly have as their object the avoidance of war, are really pursued with 
the intention of producing in Berlin an uncomfortable feeling and of 
creating in Germany the desire to do everything to withdraw from 
the entrapping by the English politics. France, which sincerely de- 
sires the maintenance of peace and the improvement of her relations 
wit];i Germany, will have to make strong diplomatic efforts to prove 
to Berlin, that the Entente cordiale need not disquiet Germany and 
had not been consumated to hinder her in her expansion. 

One is so keenly sensitive of this precarious condition, and the 
danger of this by-play, that all official and earnest press organs are 
silent about this situation of things and none of them will risk the 
enjoyment of the manifestation of the English friendship." 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 25. 

Monsieur E. de Cartier, the Belgian charge d'affairs in London, 
writes under date, 

London. March 28, 1907. 

In his letter he states that since the foreign affairs of Russia have 
been intrusted to M. Iswolski a noticeable approach between the 
cabinets of St. James and St. Petersburg had been effected and that 

18 



an understanding, impossible two years ago, seemed to be near con- 
sumation. He continues as follows : 

"The Dogger-bank incident, the English sympathies with Japan 
at the time of the war of 1904, the bitter competitorship in Persia, all 
that belongs to the past and if one may trust certain indications it 
appears to us that the English policy, whose whole strength is directed 
upon the isolation of Germany, will in the near future offer the spec- 
tacle of an English-Russian Entente. Etc., etc. 

E. de CARTIER. 
No. 26. 

Berlin, March 28, 1907. 

By the resolutions adopted at the Conference of Algeciras, France, 
like all other interested powers, promised to respect the independence 
of the Sultan of Morocco. But this didn't prevent the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to remark to my Paris Colleague that the Sultarr 
was nothing but a puppet who had nothing else to do but to obey the 
dictates of the diplomatic corps. Just as little does it prevent a gov- 
ernment supported French Company from establishing wireless teleg- 
raphy, even with disrespect of the sovereign rights of the Sultan and 
in spite of his protests. 

The resolutions further announced equal rights for all, excepting 
in regards to the Police and Banking Systems. In spite of the ex- 
plicit wording, M. Pichon construes the text to mean that French 
supremacy would have to supervene everywhere. 

The French arrogance is becoming again just as great as in the 
worst days of the Second Empire and the entente cordiale is to be 
blamed for it. It has even risen a degree or two since the negotia- 
tions between London and St. Petersburg, of which France, no doubt, 
has been cognizant, appear to bring about an entente. 

I will not say that there exists already between the cabinets the 
contemplation of an attack upon Germany. Germany can defend 
herself, but the responsibility for a war, the result of which is more 
than doubtful should appall the bravest. But one must not forget 
that all wars oi the most recent occurrence have not been made by 
the governments. They have been forced upon them by popular 
unrest, and the regrouping of the European Powers has been effected 
for the purpose of leading public opinion upon dangerous roads. The 
effects make themselves felt already. 

The French press unanimously places the responsibility of Doctor 
Mauchamp's assassination upon Germany, which it regards as a con- 
sequence of frictions instigated in Berlin. Would it not be more 
logical to attribute the ferment among the natives of Morocco to 
methods by which France and England agreed to convert Morocco 
into a French colony. 

The English press continues its campaign caluming with greater 
bitterness than ever. It sees the hand of Germany in every thing 
that is unpleasant for England. In case of need it manufactures whole 
stories such as ostensibly the plan of closing the Baltic Sea. All this 
occurs at a moment when England is creating discord by her en- 
deavors to force the explanation not of her own armament but that 
of her opponents at the Hague Conference and in this way conjures 
a reduction of the safety of Europe. GREINDL. 

19 



No. 27. 

Berlin, April 8, 1907. 
Baron Greindl. 

As I already had the honor of reporting to you a few days ago, 
that the moment I had cognizance of the Algeciras Acts, I had the 
conviction that France had not relinquished but merely postponed to 
a more favorable moment, her plan of annexing Morocco. France 
took over the police and the controlling influence of the bank. Along 
the extensive common border there are living a number of nonsub- 
jugated tribes which will furnish France with ample pretext for 
mtervention. If needful she can even invent one as she did at the 
time in Tunis. She also has a ready army in Hegeria and France, 
therefore has the means at her disposition of materializing her am- 
bitious intentions. 

If I had ever carried the illusion that the pledges of Algeciras 
would be loyally kept, the attitude of the French Government on the 
question of selection of a director of public works, the occupation 

of Yd and a recent article in the "Temps" would have destroyed 

the illusion. 

We just have to experience again to our cost what the return 
to the traditions of the second empire or rather to those of the usual 
French policy, means. Every time that France, in the course of 
history, has felt herself strong enough she has endeavored to assume 
the sovereignity of the whole world. Right now the Entente cordiale 
with England gives her the necessary confidence. 

Very likely France has resumed again elsewhere her usual meth- 
ods of not bothering herself about obligations which are irksome to 
her and of generally insisting upon her demands. 

GREINDL. 

No. 28. 

London. April 12, 1907. 
E. de Cartier. 

In this letter de Cartier discusses the visit of the King of England 
to the Spanish Baths and the possibly hidden political intentions 
connected with it. The fact that the under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Afifairs accompanied their majesties to Cartagena seems to 
indicate that the visit was not for pleasurable purposes only. He 
makes the noteworthy remark, that the visit of King Edward with 
his royal nephew in Cartagena had above all the intention of tighten- 
ing the relations of Spain with Great Britain and of weakening Ger- 
man influence in Madrid. But there are no plausible grounds for 
assuming any practical results which may have been obtained at this 
meeting. 

DE CARTIER. 

No. 29. 

Berlin, April 18, 1907. 
Baron Greindl. 

In this letter Baron Greindl openly stated that King Edward's 
visit to the King of Spain is merely a part of his campaign for the 

20 



isolation of Germany. He further refers to the contemplated visit of 
the English King to the King of Italy in Gaeta, and states that it 
will not aflford anything new. The understanding between Italy, 
England and France is a fact, irrespective of the Triple Alliance, and 
dates from the moment that Italy began to enter into an agreement 
with these powers about the extent of interests along the Mediter- 
ranean. If this agreement had not existed earlier, the entente cordiale 
between France and England would have brought it about. How 
could Italy, in case of a conflict, manage to protect her extensive 
coast lines against the attacks of the combined French and English 
fleets? And what could her German and Austro-Hungarian allies 
do for her protection? 

This zeal to unite powers, which no one threatens, ostensibly for 
the purpose of self defense, may be justly regarded with suspicion. 
It is impossible for Berlin to forget the oflfer of 100,000 men which 
the King of England made to M. Delcasse. We ourselves have to 
remember the remarkable disclosures which Colonel Barnardiston 
made to General Ducarne and who knows whether there have not 
been similar intrigues which have not come to our knowledge. 

GREINDL. 

No. 30. 

London, May 24, 1907. 
Count Lalaing. 

In this report Count Lalaing refers to the fact that the attitude 
of the English toward the Germans has not improved and gives for 
his reasons the activities of certain individuals whose duplicity he 
at the same time exposes. 

"A certain category of the press, here known under the title of 
'Yellow Journalism,' is responsible in the greatest measure for the 
inimical sentiment between the two nations. What can possibly be 
expected of such a journalist as that man Harmsworth, now Lord 
Northclifife, publisher of the 'Daily Mail,' the 'Daily Mirror,' the 
'Daily Graphic,' the 'Daily Express,' the 'Evening News' and the 
'Weekly Dispatch,' who in an interview for the 'Matin' says: 'Yes, 
we despise the Germans from the bottom of our hearts. They make 
themselves hated in all Europe. I shall not permit my newspapers to 
print the least thing which might injure France, but I do not want 
her to do anything which may be agreeable to the Germans.' " 

But, of course, the same publisher attacked the French with equal 
venom in 1899, he wanted to boycott the Paris Exposition and wrote: 
"The French have succeeded in convincing John Bull that they are his 
bitter enemies, England has wavered for a long time between Germany 
and France, but she has always respected the German character, while 
it has come about to feel only contempt for France. A cordial under- 
standing can never exist between England and her next door neighbor. 
Enough of France which possesses neither courage nor political 
sense." 

This type of journalists, publishers of cheap but widely read 
papers falsify at their pleasure the opinions of an entire nation. 

21 



It is perfectly clear that official Eng-land silently pursues a policy 
inimical to Germany. This policy which aims mainly at the isolation 
of Germany, has not found disfavor with King Edward who has placed 
his personal influence to the service of this idea ; but it surely is ex- 
ceedingly dangerous to poison public opinion in such an openly 
shameless manner in which this irresponsible press which I mentioned 
above has done it. 

LALAING. 



Baron Greindl, 



No. 31. 

Berlin. May 30. 1907. 



In this letter Baron Greindl speaks of the reception and enter- 
tainments which the visiting English journalists were receiving in 
Germany and discusses the efforts which were being made by both 
parties to re-establish better feelings. Baron Greindl, however, is 
skeptical and says : "The strained relations between the two coun- 
tries are the more difficult to remove because there are no definite 
questions of dispute at the bottom of it. If there existed a conflict 
between Germany and England like the one between London and 
Paris on account of Egypt, some form of exchange of ideas would 
make an end of it. But upon the entire globe there is absolutely noth- 
ing which could possibly dim the relations between Germany and 
England. The coolness in the relations does not arise from any 
concrete facts. It is merely a question of sentiment." 

"England looks askance upon the wonderful progress of Germany 
in the domains of industry, commerce and merchant marine. Habit- 
uated to being without a rival, every competition appears to her as an 
infringement upon her rights. In regards to the development of the 
German navy. England pretends a solicitude, the sincerity of which, 
I consider more than doubtful. To the contrary, Germany has every- 
thing to fear. For centuries England has made it her business to 
• destroy the naval power of foreign nations, just as soon as they had 
reached an appreciable significance. France has had to experience this 
after Holland. Then came the turn of Denmark whose ships were 
destroyed by Admiral Nelson without the least pretext after he had 
entered the port of Kopenhagen as a friend." 

Far removed from any intention to bring about any tension in 
her relations to England, Germany suffers through these conditions 
as is proven by the repeated attempts at an understanding, the ini- 
tiative of which has always come from Berlin. 

The tension between the German-English affairs may possibly be 
serviceable for some pusillanimus, shortsighted, political speculations, 
but it endangers the higher interest for the maintenance of European 
peace, this had been secured to us during thirty-six years by the over- 
balance of Germany. It encourages in their plans those statesmen 
who are not content with the status quo. 

GREINDL. 

22 



No. 32. 

Berlin, June 8, 1907. 
Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl discusses the various entertainments which had 
been prepared for the visiting English journalists by their German 
colleagues and mentions how the official press had repeatedly ex- 
pressed the wish that the friendly personal relations which had been 
established, might result in bettering the relations between the two 
countries. But at the end of his descriptive report. Baron Greindl 
summarizes in the following pregnant terms : "What will be the re- 
sult of all these manifestations? Probably nothing. The report which 
you forwarded to me day before yesterday, proves to me that my 
colleague in London, who, by the way, is in a much better position 
than I, to judge the conditions, is much more skeptical than I. As 
Count Lalaing very properly says, the King of England pursues per- 
sonally a policy, the final aim of which is the isolation of Germany. 
His procedure corresponds with the sentiment of the nation which 
has been misled by an unscrupulous press, which only has in mind a 
sale as large as possible, and is, therefore, solely and alone, concerned 
in baiting the passions of the common people. And it is not only the 
cheap newspapers which bemean themselves to such measures. The 
'Times' has carried on for years a campaign of calumnies and lies. Its 
correspondent in Berlin, who has every opportunity of informing him- 
self thoroughly, stirs up the hatred of the English against the Ger- 
mans by attributing to the Imperial Government ambitious intentions 
— the folly of which is apparent — and accusing it of all sorts of sin- 
ister machinations to which it has never given a thought. Neverthe- 
less the people of England believe it without the wink of an eye-lash, 
because these inventions correspond with their prejudices. How 
could, then, an anti-German sentiment be converted by an insignifi- 
cant number of honest and clear-seeing journalists? The English 
journalists, who have accepted the hospitality, belong, no doubt, in 
the majority, to this elite. One has already preached to converts." 

GREINDL. 

No. 33. 

Paris, June 17, 1907. 
A. Leghait. 

Monsieur A. Leghait refers in his letter to the friendly under- 
standing between France, England and Spain. According to M. 
Pic'hon's explanations, the understanding is of a purely diplomatic 
nature, and contains neither a military convention nor secret clauses. 
The object is purely the maintenance of the status quo in those parts 
of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean in which the three 
powers are interested. He further refers to the ostensibly peaceful 
character of the agreement but raises the question about the menaces 
which would justify such large safety measures. He states that there 
are many discerning people who believe that, instead of securing 
peace, these preparations will provoke war and contend that if com- 
plications should arise in Europe, France will be the first to receive 
the blow, and also will have to carry the eventual consequences. Mr. 

23 



Leg-hait concludes this letter with the following opinion : "In order 
to equip herself momentarily against dangers, which probably only 
exists in her imagination, or possibly only to fortify the position of 
the leaders in her internal politics. France is saddling herself with 
a debt of gratitude, which will appear the heavier, if one of these days, 
England discloses the objects, for which she will utilize the strength 
which she is marshalling around her today." 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 34. 

London. June 19, 1907. 
Count Lalaing. 

In very much the same manner, the same opinions and the same 
skepticism, which M. Leghait's letter expresses. Count of Lalaing- 
refers to the agreement between France, England and Spain. He says,, 
however, "It could scarcely be believed that Germany does not see in 
this agreement anything else but a continuation of the English policy 
which aims in every way to isolate the German Empire." 

LALAING. 

No. 35. 

Berlin, June 22, 1907. 
Baron Greindl. 

With his customary perspicacity Baron Greindl also discusses the 
French-English and Spanish agreement, and says that international 
understandings are the style, but he continues : "If the agreements 
contain no secret clauses, they appear to have been made for no other 
reason excepting the pleasure of setting Germany aside in the regula- 
tion of the world's affairs. These safety measures against imaginary 
dangers are, however, very apt to create and nourish the idea that 
Germany were the power bent upon attack, and that the other powers 
were obliged to consolidate against her undertakings. The damage 
would not be so great if these contracts were superfluous, but they 
compromise the cause of peace, which, ostensibly, they are meant 
to serve, because they arouse the conviction in the minds of all Ger- 
many-hating circles, that the moment of the materialization of their 
plans is drawing near. 

GREINDL. 

No. 36. 

Berlin, July 1, 1907. 
Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl speaks of the new French Ambassador in Berlin,. 
M. Cambon, who expresses himself to the effect that he contemplated 
bringing about a better understanding between his own country and 
Germany. "But in his (Baron Greindl's) opinion, the best which 
could possibly be achieved would be correct relations between Berlin 
and Paris. A real and lasting approachment would presuppose the 
exclusion of all ideas of revenge, but even among the most reasonable 
and peace-loving French, there is not one who in the innermost 
recesses of his heart does not preserve at least a hope of it." 

GREINDL. 
24 



No. 37. 

London, Aug. 10, 1907. 
E. de Cartier. 

The English public is following with interest the developments 
of the Moroccan crisis. The newspapers are publishing long reports, 
but in general they are fairly moderate in their remarks and con- 
templations to which the tragic events, at present taking place in 
Casa Blanca and other places, give rise. 

Even though public opinion is all on the side of France, in this 
matter, it is probably that way because it is not particularly delighted 
with the idea that this is the first result of that dictum of peaceful 
penetration advocated but a short time ago by Delcasse, but, probably 
for the most part, because it is imagined, whether rightly or wrongly, 
that the military undertakings, whose playgrounds at the time are the 
Moroccan ports, are disagreeable to Germany. 

E. DE CARTIER. 

No. 38. 
Count Lalaing. 

London, October 11, 1907. 
Count Lalaing in this report calls the attention of the Minister 
to the leader in the "Times" referring to the recent visit of the German 
Emperor to London and the veiled attacks upon the German Chan- 
cellor, Prince Buelow. Sir Edward Grey is quoted as having stated 
that the improvement of the English-German relations were depend- 
ent upon the establishment of a good understanding between Germany 
and France." 

LALAING- 

No. 39. 

Berlin, January 27, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

In this letter Baron Greindl discusses the speech which Monsieur 
Delcasse made before the Chamber of Deputies. He frankly says that 
the speech made a painful impression upon him, not because Delcasse, 
after three years of silence, had praised his own policy, but because 
of the praise he got for it, and because of the manner in which, espe- 
cially, the London press had received it. The speech virtually swarms 
with innuendoes which are injurious to Germany. Delcasse said in 
his diatribe that the German Government had had absolutely no pre- 
text for intervention in Morocco, and, consequently, it must have had 
intentions of its own. Europe had just then escaped a sort of Hege- 
mony, and all nations who had the independence of Europe at heart 
and who desired to strengthen this independence, had rallied around 
France. 

Baron Griendl now takes up his own criticism and writes : 
"Where has Delcasse ever seen that Germany intended to force her 
sovereignty upon the other European peoples? We are her next door 
neighbors, and since twenty years I have been unable to discover in 
the Imperial Government the slightest tendency of misusing its power 

25 



and our weakness. I would only wish that all the other great powers 
had exercised the same forbearance toward us." 

Delcasse says that Germany had never had the intention of mak- 
ing war on account of Morocco. That is very true ; but instead of 
ascribing this moderation to the peaceful intentions of the Emperor, 
he sees the cause for it in the fact that France had the majority of 
the powers, the public opinion of the whole world and above all his 
own self confidence for herself. 

In other words Delcasse praises himself for having maintained 
the world's peace, thanks to his coalition with the King of England in 
his isolation policy against Germany. 

M. Delcasse says one should not disj)lace a foreign policy (that 
is his own) which had twice already preserved the peace of Europe. 

"Under which circumstances then? When has the peace of 
Europe ever been threatened excepting by the French thoughts of 
revenge?" 

In conclusion I would like to indicate that the praise which the 
English papers accorded to Delcasse, clearly demonstrates how much 
is thought of the recent approachment between Germany and England. 

"The policy, which King Edward VII pursues under the pretext 
of saving Europe from a German danger, has conjured an only too 
real French danger, which in the first place is menacing to us." 

GREINDL. 

No. 40. 

Paris. January 27-30, 1908. 
A. Leghait. 

Monsieur Leghait writes in his report on the events which have 
taken place in Morocco and which have made public opinion catch its 
breath. He further mentions that the most important and entirely 
unlooked for event of the season had been the appearance of M. Del- 
casse. the former Minister of Foreign Afifairs, who was dismissed 
under such tragic circumstances in June, 1905. Since then M. 
Delcasse has refrained from any expressions of self justification with 
as much tact as patriotism; his silence had been recognized here as 
well as on the other side of the Eastern frontier. But the question is : 
Has M. Delcasse just accidentally or premeditatively entered into the 
debate. He presented the history of the friendships which grouped 
themselves about France during his a<hninistration, and ascri]:)eil to 
himself the merit of having created a new situation, which, in his 
opinion, makes a war with Germany impossible. The French Chau- 
vinist has made this assertion enthusiastically his own, without asking 
himself, 1st: "Whether this regrouping of the powers is not the result 
of a comprehensive program which has been wonderfully formulated 
in London, and, in the accomplishment of which, M. Delcasse has 
been far more of a tool rather than the driving power? 2d, Whether 
his assertion is well founded that the resistance to the German de- 
mands in 1905, and the refusal to go to Algeciras would not have 
brought about a war?" It is very easy today for the ex-Minister to 
utter, for his own benefit, siich a viewpoint in order to inflame the 
patriotic sentiments of those, who had suflfered the humiliation of 

26 



1905. But that changes nothing of the fact, that all. who applauded 
M. Delcasse yesterday, had, at the time of his downfall, a materially 
different conception of the result of his policy ; no one had offered 
him a helping hand or had risked to utter word of defense, when he 
was sacrificed. Even if M. Delcasse has succeeded by already striking 
a patriotic chord, to achieve a decidedly personal benefit, the question 
is, however, w^hether he has not committed a grave political error 
by bringing again into prominence ticklish issues and in risking to 
produce in the foreign press new and dangerous polemics. One can 
see already how much his speech has been valued in England and 
how much it has been criticised in Germany. 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 41. 

Berlin, January 29, 1907. 
Baron Greindl. 

In addition to my report of day before yesterday, I beg to call 
your attention to a Berlin telegram in the Cologne Gazette, No. 98, 
which is, undoubtedly, of official origin. 

The Gazette says that the challenging tone of Delcasse has not 
passed unnoticed by Germany. It congratulates on the temperate 
tone of the German press the more, as the French press is returning 
also to a more moderate attitude. The expressions which were uttered 
against the adventurous policy, defended by Delcasse, became more 
numerous. One might have hopes that no lasting mischief had 
resulted. 

The official telegram further remarks that the press of those 
countries which maintained friendly relations with France, had, by no 
means, been delighted with the ebullitions of Delcasse. They had 
already been condemned in England by some of the newspapers. 
The Italian and the Spanish press had been still more severe. In 
both of these countries the declaration was made that they were 
unwilling to follow France on a course of adventurous policy, upon 
which Delcasse endeavored to force her. This had been expressed 
with such a clearness which may have contributed in producing a 
cooler conception of the situation. 

GREINDL. 

No. 42. 

Berlin, February 2, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

In this letter. Baron Greindl refers to the draft of a proposed 
"increase of the Navy, and that it had been accepted in the Reichstag, 
Bebel alone dissenting. Greindl says that this unanimity confirms 
the correctness of his own conclusions and showed better than all 
'conventions of princes and political speeches what, in reality, were 
the relations between Germany and England." No man here has ever 
harbored the absurd and impossible thought of an attack upon Eng- 
land but the whole world feels apprehensions of an English attack." 
And here Greindl states is the reason why the Reichstag, without 
batting an eye, passed the bill for the enormous increase of naval 

27 



expenditures, although the Imperial Budget showed a deficit and no 
one knows how it can be equalized. 

GREINDL. 

No. 43. 

Berlin, March 28, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

The document by Baron Greindl is brief and simply refers again 
to the acceptance of the increase of the naval budget. The sentiment 
in its favor had been so great that it passed the three readings in one 
session in spite of the fact that the national budget showed already 
a deficit. 

GREINDL. 

No. 44. 

Berlin, May 6, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

The most interesting part in the White Book, which I had the 
honor to submit to you with my report of yesterday, is the forbear- 
ance, with which the German Government apparently tries to over- 
look the palpable contradiction which arises between the perfectly 
.unobjectionable explanations of the French Government and the con- 
quest of Morocco, to which France is proceeding on the strength 
of an ostensible European mandate, which nobody had ever given her. 
France pretends to have been forced to it by the circumstances which 
she designates as accidental, but which, on the contrary, she herself, 
has very studiously produced. Immediately after the assassination 
of her citizens in Casa Blanca. and without having grounds for the 
assumption that the Moroccan Government would fail to discover and 
punish the guilty ones, the French Government has proceeded in a 
manner which is far more despicable than the murders, insofar as, that 
at the same time, when her delegates, full of virtue, made beautiful 
and humanitarian speeches at the Hague, they bombarded an open 
town, butchered women and children and completely ruined harm- 
less merchants. 

Undoubtedly, one must have foreseen in Paris that this brutal 
proceeding would produce not only in Morocco, but in the whole 
Mohammedan world, a movement not only inimical to foreigners in 
general but above all anti-French ; this movement furnished the de- 
sired pretext for occupation, which, it is true, was officially declared 
to be a temporary one, but which, evidently, was to be made into a 
permanent one. At the Quay d'Orsay one has returned to the policy 
of M. Delcasse, but has hung the mantle of dissimulation around it. 
But one begins to discard even that. There is no longer any idea 
of impartiality in regard to the two pretenders. The French Govern- 
ment has arraigned itself openly on the side of Abdul Azis, who, dis-' 
carded by his own people, has accepted French protection so as to 
save a semblance of sovereignty and perhaps his life. 

Germany permits it to happen. She can do no otherwise. The 
time for diplomatic negotiations has passed. She can only choose 
between an intentional ignoring it and a war which latter the Emperor 

28 



does not desire, and the German public opinion would condemn. 
Germany's interest is too slight to justify the risk of an European 
conflict. Many regard it as absolutely nil. The Moroccan adventure 
will cost France a great deal of blood and money. Why should Ger- 
many dissuade her from an undertaking which will lay her lame along 
the Vogesan front for a long time to come. 

GREINDL. 

No. 45. 

Berlin, May 10, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

Great hopes had been placed upon M. Cambon for the improve- 
ment of the relations with France. But to the contrary, he has shown 
himself suspicious, distrustful, scents everywhere similar intentions 
and is badly informed like all diplomats who make use of spies. His 
task is not being made easier by the attitude which the French Gov- 
ernment has taken since the policy of the King of England has greatly 
diminished the stability of Europe. 

Baron Greindl then discusses the meeting of the German Emperor 
and all other reigning German princes in Vienna on the occasion of 
the jubilee of the Austrian Emperor and further refers to the dis- 
regard of the agreement of Algeciras by France, to the remarkable 
English proposals in regard to Macedonia, the Serbian agitation in 
Croatia and to the false rumors spread by the Russian press about 
suppositious preparations for war by Turkey, which create the im- 
pression as if Russia wanted to rehabilitate her army still burdened 
by the results of her defeats in Manchuria. 

GREINDL. 

No. 46. 

Berlin, May 13, 1908. 
Letter of Baron Greindl's omitted. It treats of the reception of 
a Moroccan delegation but is of minor interest. 

No. 47. 

Berlin, May 30, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

After reviewing at length the reception and visit of the French 
President Fallieres in England, Baron Greindl speaks of the protes- 
tations on the part of the three powers of the Entente that their alli- 
ance had no other significance excepting the preservation of the peace 
of Europe, a pretext which is contradicted by the wars of conquest 
in Manchuria, the Transvaal and Morocco. He further writes : They 
are the same powers, which, in conjunction with the United States 
(and which latter just about have their own war of robbery against 
Spain behind themselves) have posed as ultra-pacifists at the Hague. 
The Triple Alliance has assured the world's peace during thirty years, 
because it stood under the leadership of Germany, which was satis- 
fied with the political disposition of Europe. The new grouping 
menaces it, because it is composed of powers, who desire a revision 

29 



of the Status Quo, and that to such an extent, that they have silenced 
the feeHngs of hatred of hundreds of years in order to materialize 
this desire. 

GREINDL. 
No. 48. 

Berlin, June 12, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

In this report, Baron Greindl speaks of the meeting of the King 
of England and the Emperor of Russia at Reval on June 8th, and 
where again the same old protestations of good intentions and friend- 
ship have been aired. But here again the astute statesman continues : 
"The true intentions of the powers, which England has grouped for 
the isolation of Germany, are not to be found in the speeches of the 
sovereigns nor in the articles of the official or inspired newspapers. 
Their real intentions are so far away from the language they use, 
that they can't prevent exposing them unintentionally. If one wants 
to learn them, one need only to read the admonition which the 
"Temps" addressed to the King of Sweden. The Parisian newspaper 
regards the friendly feelings which His Majesty expressed for Ger- 
many as an insult to Russia which reflected upon France. 

It would be presumptions if one should conclude from the mis- 
trust, which exists between France, England and Russia, that the new 
triple alliance would not be brought about. The three powers are 
united by the common hatred against Germany and can find either 
real or imaginary security against the danger of becoming involved in 
war on account of foreign interests. 

GREINDL. 
No. 49 

Berlin July 4, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

Yesterday I asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
whether he had not as yet received the Russo-English proposals in 
regard to the Macedonian reforms, which interest us from the view- 
point of maintenance of correct relations between the High Powers. 
"I said that I was worried about another point and that was the 
manner in which the consultations between London and St. Peters- 
burg were being conducted under the exclusion of Austria-Hungary, 
which, however, had an interest of the first order in the Balkan af- 
fairs." Mr. Von Schoen did not contradict me. He replied briefly 
that, apparently, nothing remained any more of the Muerzsteger 
agreement. I refrained, naturally, from a longer dalliance with this 
ticklish theme. 

GREINDL. 

No. 50 

Berlin, July 18, 1908. 
Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl discusses in this report a conversation of one of 
his colleagues with Secretary of State Von Schoen in regard to the 
contemplated visit of the President with the Emperor of Russia and 
any possible political significance. 

30 



Baron Greindl's colleague called Von Schoen's attention to the 
fact that the visit of the President of the French Republic with the 
King of England had been regarded in Berlin as an event of serious 
significance. 

Von Schoen replied that this had been, indeed, the case, but that 
the circumstances had been dififerent. The personal policy of the 
King of England was outspoken anti-German. According to reports 
which had reached the German Government, England had intended 
going a great deal further by way of her entente with France and 
Russia than she actually had succeeded. France had declined. Be- 
fore even any rumors of a compact had gained circulation and while 
President Fallieres was still in London, Monsieur Cambon had sought 
M. Von Schoen and told him that the French Government was find- 
ing itself in a ticklish situation. Without offering any further ex- 
planation, he begged him not to believe any disturbing news which 
might reach him, but to be assured that France honestly desired 
peace." Baron Greindl then calls the attention of his chief, the Min- 
ister of Foreign Afifairs, to the resignation of the English Ambassador 
in Berlin and says that the resignation was a voluntary one in form 
only. In reality, it had been demanded by the British Government 
on account of a decided pro-German attitude on the part of Sir Frank 
Lascelles. Baron Greindl concludes his resume of Lascelles' atti- 
tude in the following words : 

"The zeal which he developed in removing misunderstandings, 
which he pronounced as stupid and injurious in a high degree to both 
countries, does not correspond with the political attitudes of his ruler." 

GREINDL. 

No. 51 

Paris, July 20. 1908. 
A. Leghait. 

Mr. Leghait states in his report, the departure from France of 
President Fallieres and of his official visits with the Emperor of 
Russia and the Kings of Sweden, Denmark and Norway. This voy- 
age, Mr. Leghait writes, was ostensibly one of courtesy, but really 
of a political character in so far as it was intended to prevent any 
too close and too friendly grouping of those countries under the 
wings of Germany. Both Fallieres as well as Cambon would beg to 
assure everybody that the aim of France was the preservation of 
peace and that the French diplomacy would follow the lines of faith- 
fulness to her associates and friends, etc. 

But, says M. Leghait : "It is true that the French policy is lead 
by peaceful ideas, but will France, in the tow of England, remain 
master of the situation and be able to avoid any dangerous displeas- 
ure on the other side of the Rhine?" 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 52 

Paris, October 8, 1908. 
A. Leghait. 

In connection with the communications which I had the honor 
of transmitting to you with my yesterday's report, I hasten to send 

31 



you several articles from to-day's Temps Vv^hich have reference to 
the Balkan incident. The explanation of Mr. Iswolsky is the more 
interesting, as he has confirmed its correctness himself. From his 
explanation it appears, that the information which I gave you yes- 
terday about the object which Russia pursues by her proposition 
for a call of a conference, had been correct, Russia desires to destroy 
the Berlin contract aimed against her own policy and counts upon 
the support of France and England. But the question is whether 
Germany will permit the destruction of the work of Prince Bismarck 
without punishment. 

No. 53 

Paris, January 19, 1909. 
A. Leghait. 

Mr. Leghait's report deals with the debates in the French Cham- 
ber of Deputies on the Moroccan policy, but is of minor interest. 

LEGHAIT. 

No. 54 

Paris, February 13, 1909. 
Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl reports on the visit of the King and Queen of 
England to Berlin and states that during their four days' sojourn 
nothing had been left undone to make the reception of their Majesties 
as cordial as possible, etc. 

With his usual skepticism, however, he goes on to say: The 
King of England avers that the maintenance of peace had always 
been the aim of his endeavors; he has always said that since the be- 
ginning of his successful diplomatic campaign, which he has suc- 
cessfully carried out for the isolation of Germany ; but it cannot escape 
anybody that the world's peace has never been more seriously endan- 
gered than since the King of England has undertaken to strengthen it. 

The visit of the King of England falls together with a consid- 
erable increase of the naval budget, with the building of ironclads 
of the dreadnought type, and with the formation of the strongest 
fleet that ever has existed and whose domestic harbor is in the North 
Sea and which is most adjacent to the German coast lines. Does 
this happen purely for the protection against a possible attack which 
Germany is not at all in a position to undertake? 

The agitation for the creation of a territorial army still goes on. 
England does not need it for her defense. What does she want with 
it unless it be an ulterior motive in regard to an attack upon the 
continent? 

These conjectures are forcing themselves upon one and make 
comprehensible why the Germans hesitate to consider the relaxation 
as an accomplished fact. 

GREINDL. 

No. 55 

Berlin, February 17, 1909. 
Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl's report is rather unimportant, dealing chiefly with 
the impressions which the visit of the King of England to Berlin 

32 



had left behind. His Majesty, suffering with cold and fatigue, has 
not indulged in any political conversations and had only spoken a 
few minutes with the German Chancellor and those only to satisfy 
the demands of common courtesy. 

GREINDL. 
No. 56 
Baron Greindl. 

Berlin, March 22, 1909. 
The newspapers are full of the debates which have taken place 
by the budget commission in the Reichstag at the same time that 
the transactions of Lower House occurred in England, I should only 
like to remark that when one hears the speakers who have detailed 
in London, how the English sea power must be organized to meet 
every danger, one might believe that Germany was, with the ex- 
ception of Great Britain, the only power which possessed any navy 
at all. 

GREINDL. 
No. 57 

Berlin, May 31, 1909. 
In regard to the question of restricting naval preparations which 
had been asked of Chancellor Buelow, the latter had been forced to 
reply. He did so as briefly as possible, inasmuch as the Reichstag 
did not demand exhaustive details. In England, however, the same 
question called forth an extensive debate. Sir Edward Grey declared 
there was no reason for blaming Germany if she could not make the 
English viewpoint her own, but he expressed a lively regret that 
Germany had declined the English propositions. 

The English press, which does not need to exercise the same 
reservations as the British Government, vents her bad humor by still 
plainer expressions, but Baron Greindl's conception of the situation 
is, "The attitude of mind in England reminds one of that in France 
during the years of 1866-1870. At that time the French believed 
themselves justified in preventing the re-establishment of unity in 
Germany, because they saw therein a menace of sovereignity which 
France had so far exercised upon the continent. In just the same 
light one regards to-day in London the refusal to remain dependent 
of the grace of England as an unfriendly act and a menace of the 
peace. 

GREINDL. 
No. 58 

Berlin, April 1, 1909. 
Significant in this report are Baron Greindl's statements in regard 
to the machinations of Iswolski and Sir Edward Grey to force Austria 
to a compromise which would have been humiliating to her. But 
these sinister intentions had been frustrated by the unmistakable and 
decisive attitude of Germany, which, notwithstanding all pressure, 
never had relinquished it. Germany alone has forced the peace. 
The Powers, which composed the re-grouping organized by the King 
of England, have measured their strength with the alliance of the 
European Central Powers and they have shown themselves inade- 
^quate in loosening this alliance. Hence the disgruntled sentiment. 

GREINDL. 
33 



No. 59 

Berlin, April 27. 1909. 

Several days ago the Koelnishe Zeitung- published a brief official 
article, stating that at the recent meeting of Prince Buelow and Mr. 
Titoni in Venice no mention of a renewal of the Triple Entente had 
been made. This was not necessary, but the result of the conference 
had been highly satisfactory. I did not write to you about it be- 
cause that kind of information does not signify anything. It is the 
necessary ovitcome of any meeting between either sovereigns or 
leading statesmen 

For, as a matter of fact, a very long time neither Berlin or 
Vienna have had any illusions in regard to an eventual assistance 
on the part of Italy. The Quirinal has entered into obligations with 
England and France and has continually coquetted with London and 
Paris. Notwithstanding it adheres to the Triple Alliance as a guar- 
antee of faith to its new friends who, however, only inspire it with 
limited confidence; it reserves itself the chance of putting itself on 
the side of the strongest, as, for instance, in Algeciras when it sup- 
ported France and England, and, as recently, in the Oriental ques- 
tion, when it finally joined Germany and Austria the moment it be- 
came evident where the success would be and after having held a 
double-faced attitude. 

Germany and Austria merely keep or suffer Italy in the Triple 
Alliance because her official withdrawal would signify a lessening: 
of prestige and because one sees the possibility of having her as an 
opponent in the case of a conflict, but that is all one expects of her. 
On the other hand, one would not stand for her as earnestly as Ger- 
many did just now for Austria-Hungary; neither Vienna nor Berlin 
would compromise themselves for the sake of such a doubtful ally. 

GREINDL. 

No. 60 

Berlin, June 21, 1909. 
Baron Greindl. 

The German Emperor reached Potsdam again day before yes- 
terday after his visit with the Emperor of Russia. Both sovereigns 
expressed their intention of maintaining the traditionally friendly 
and trustful relations which exist between the two houses and which 
serve as a pledge for the good relations between the two countries 
for the preservation of peace. 

Even the official notice which appeared yesterday in No. 142 of 
the "North German Gazette" has scarcely strayed from what, on such 
occasions, is always usual. It also states that the statesmen who 
accompanied the two emperors had naturally discussed the pending 
political questions. It was also recognized that the existing interna- 
tional agreements, in which Russia as well as Germany are concerned, 
are in no way opposed to these good relations. 

In such a way Berlin has always contemplated the Triple Alli- 
ance which was formed solely and alone as a defensive contract. But 
this conception is by no means shared in Paris nor by its chief in- 
stigator, the King of England. The ill feeling which became evident 

34 



in France and England the moment that the contemplated confer- 
ence became known, proves that the Triple Entente was regarded 
by both countries as something different from a contract which would 
place no obstacle for the maintenance of the traditional trustful friend- 
ship between Germany and Russia. 

GREINDL. 

No. 61 

Paris, August 3, 1909. 
By Count Arschot Schoonhoven, Belgian Charge d' Affaires in Paris. 

As it had been announced a long time ago, the President of the 
Republic and the Emperor of Russia met in Cherbourg on the 31st 
of July. If one recalls the time of the first voyage of the Czar to 
Paris, the visits of Felix Faure to St. Petersburg and of Admiral 
Avelane in France, one must be astonished at the slight sensation 
which the meeting of the two sovereigns produced in the country. 
It is true, the newspapers concern themselves with it, but not more 
than with any other event, and there remains really nothing of the 
jag of enthusiasm which made the whole of France giddy during the 
beautiful days of the Russian Alliance. 



No. 62 



ARSCHOT. 



Berlin, Nov. 7, 1910. 



Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl reviews in this report the visit of the Czar with 
the Emperor of Germany ; this visit has been more significant than 
simply politic. During his brief sojourn, the Czar was accompanied 
by his new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sazonow, who had also 
been received by the Emperor and the Chancellor. Baron Greindl 
surmises that during these meetings there had been, very likely, no 
scarcity of food for discussion. The events in Persia and the Far 
East, while politically of no importance to Germany, might, however, 
close those countries to German commerce. Russia always had 
looked upon the German railroad project with ill-concealed disap- 
proval. All those problems, says Greindl, are too complex to be 
removed in the short period of two days, the bigger part of which 
was taken up by official ceremonies, etc. During the first three- 
fourths of the 19th century the alliance between Russia and Prussia 
had been a constant and sure factor in European politics. It did 
not rest only upon the common interests of both nations, but also 
upon the intimate friendship and family relations of the two reigning 
houses. This, especially, was the case during the reign of Emperor 
Nicholas I. These relations, however, suffered the first break when 
Prince Bismarck, during the Congress in Berlin, endeavored to bring 
Russia and England together, whereby as intermediator, he experi- 
enced the usual fate of being accused of partiality by both parties. 
In consequence, the Russian people, believing themselves despoiled 
of the fruits of their victories, developed a hatred against their West- 
ern neighbors which became still more augmented by envy which 
the rapid development of German power had called forth. At first 

35 



this rupture was comparatively slight, but it was, nevertheless, pro- 
gressive, and finally led to Russia's alliance with France, the forma- 
tion of the Triple Entente and, eventually, to the intervention by 
Germany in the question of the annexation of Bosnia. 

In regard to the latter, a denial that pressure had been used had 
been entered. But, so Greindl continues, this is merely playing with 
words. Without Prince Buelow's explanation of the solidarity of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary and without the warning of the Ger- 
man Envoy, Count Pourtales, in St. Petersburg, Russia would not 
have desisted so suddenly from her agitations against Austria-Hun- 
gary in the small Slavonic states, and especially in Belgrade. The 
solution of the Bosnia question was a humiliation to Russia as well 
as a disappointment. 

In summing up the balance of this lengthy report, Greindl comes 
to the conclusion that, no matter how affairs stood in the past, the 
grouping of the European Great Powers will remain as it was before 
and the feelings of the Russian people for Germany will, therefore, 
not become any more cordial. The language of the Russian news- 
papers proves this. 

GREINDL. 

No. 63 

Berlin, March 3, 1911. 

In this report Greindl deals with the appointment of Delcasse as 
Minister of the Marine, and discusses the possible attitude of the 
German Imperial Government which will, while refraining from even 
a semblance of mixing with the internal policies of France, no doubt 
do its own thinking. For years Delcasse has regarded her as a 
"Quantite negligeable" and prided himself with having effected an 
aggressive alliance against Germany. 

But Delcasse's return to power need not to be taken too tragically. 
He is no longer entrusted with the Ministerium of Foreign Affairs. 
He has no longer King Edward VII at his side, whose co-worker he 
believed himself to be, and whose tool he was. Nevertheless, Del- 
casse is too ambitious and too unrestful a spirit not to endeavor to 
inculcate his ideas into his colleagues. Even public opinion in France 
seems bent upon a more active foreign policy. Up to a very short 
while ago Monsieur Pichon was extremely well liked, but no longer 
to-day. The result of the meeting in Potsdam, which he in no wise 
could have prevented, cannot be overlooked. This meeting never 
did need to disquiet anybody, if the Triple Entente, as it is asserted, 
had in view only the maintenance of peace. Since there has not 
appeared any change in the grouping of the powers, one should joy- 
fully receive any approachment which would improve the German- 
Russian relations, but in Paris and London just the opposite is de- 
sired. The French press has devoted considerable applause in re- 
gard to the attempted fortification of Flushing, and nobody has made 
Pichon any reproaches for going rather precipitately into this ad- 
venture, but, rather, for not having had any success with it. It really 
looks as if Delcasse had been called into the ministerial office for the 
purpose of fostering this attitude of public opinion. He has not been 

36 



intrusted with foreign affairs. That would have been a challenge ; 
but whatever could be done without breaking any glass has been 
done. 

GREINDL. 

No. 64 

Paris, March 4, 1911. 
Report of Baron Guillome, Belgian Ambassador in Paris. 

Baron Guillome speaks of the attitude of the German press toward 
the new Ministry in France, and the persistence with which it as- 
serts that the personality of Monsieur Delcasse was too pronounced 
not to exert a predominating influence upon the Ministry. He further 
refers to the incident of the "Fremden legion" with an admonition 
that it would be wise to keep an eye on it. He expresses the belief 
that the excitement over it would not go very deep in France and 
that public opinion will not be affected by it, but the press is making 
chauvinism and may use a few unfortunate expressions. "As I also 
hear there is being carried on persistently a veritable propaganda 
in Germany along the French border for the purpose of inducing 
desertion from the German Army into the French Legion." 



No. 65 



GUILLAUME. 



Berlin, March 20, 1911. 



Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl refers in this report to the speech on foreign poli- 
tics by Sir Edward Grey on the occasion of the debate on the Naval 
budget. He remarks on the fact that, with the exception of the "Nord 
Deutsch Zeitung," all other German papers had merely reported the 
gist of the speech withovit, however, any commentary. 

The "North German Gazette," as the high official organ, alone 
expressed the satisfaction of the Imperial Government. It had to 
do this, for its silence would have been construed in London as an 
insult. Baron Greindl also speaks of the indifference of the German 
public, which, he says, has been blunted by the countless meetings 
and mutual exchanges of courtesies so that it would like to protect 
itself against fresh disappointments. Here, however, Baron Greindl 
refers to the second attempt made by England to draw Belgium into 
her meshes of intrigue. He says: "This mistrust can be explained, 
especially as the English Government only quite recently participated 
in the Flushing intrigue. The proof for this we have in the demarche 
which Sir A. Hardinge made with you (that is the Belgian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) to draw us mto it." 

Greindl further remarks on Sir Edward Grey's speech which had 
not been confined to empty words as on former occasions. One action 
accompanied or, rather, preceded it: For years the English press 
has had the unheard of effrontery of supervising the completion of 
the Bagdad Railway and even to forbid it, that is, it wanted to lay 
hands upon an undertaking which concerned only Turkey, the Con- 
cession Company, and, directly, the German Government which sup- 
ported it. Sir Edward Grey has reduced this question again to within 



a legal province. He recog-nized that England possessed no title of 
right of mixing into an internal ottoman affair, and announced that 
England would confine herself to guarding her interests by legal 
measures. 

The moment is very likely favorable for an attempt at bettering 
the German-English relations. There is. at present, no question on 
hand which might mitigate against it by possible friction. 

"I beg to be permitted, sir, to invite your attention to the fact 
that this report is not intended to convey the impression that I regard 
an English-German approach as already effected or even imminent. 
Naturally, I would desire it with my whole heart, because the security 
of Belgium would thereby be considerably augmented." 

GREINDL. 

No. 66 

Berlin, April 21, 1911. 
Baron Greindl. 

Several days ago the French press set rumors afloat, according 
to which France had the assurance of not having any interference by 
Germany in the execution of such measures which were deemed 
necessary for the solution of the present Moroccan crisis. 

I do not believe that any one here has the slightest wish of enter- 
ing actively into the Moroccan afifairs. One must have lost here long 
since every illusion as to the value of the Algeciras Acts — even if 
one ever had any — which France has signed with the firm intention 
never to observe them. France has never ceased in pursuing her plans 
of annexation, be it, that she needed pretexts for grasping possessions 
which should endure forever, be it that she pressed concessions which 
brought the Sultan into submission to France, which gradually re- 
duced him to the level of the Bey of Tunis. When the Imperial Gov- 
ernment obligated itself at the Treaty of February 9, 1909, to place 
no obstacles in the way of the political interests of France in Morocco, 
it knew undoubtedly that the French Government would construe 
the clause as an encouragement to continue in the same way and 
that it would regard the promise of respecting Moroccan independence 
as a dead letter. A retroaction would be a cruel humiliation to 
France ; Germany has no reason for imposing this upon France, and 
could anyhow not change her position after a tolerance of eight years 
without not being determined at the same time, to go to war. This 
would, be relatively, more than Morocco is worth. 

If the French Government really is concerned in excluding the 
possibilities of a conflict, it is up to it of putting into broad daylight 
sufficient sagacity and simulated moderation not to force Germany 
from her passive attitude. 

GREINDL. 

No. 67 

Paris, April 29, 1911. 
The telegraph agencies inform you quicker than I can do it, of 
the various incidents, in consequence of which Morocco is keeping 
the government of the Republic busy to-day. Even if one considers 

38 



the national character of the French which continually drives them 
to exaggerate occurrences in which they are participating, one cannot 
deny that the situation in Morocco to-day is exceedingly complicated. 
The tribes are running race in their splitting up and in betrayal, and 
the problem is a difficult one for the power, which has taken over 
the mandate, or rather arrogated it, to re-establish order in Morocco. 

So far, nothing justifies the apprehension that the French expe- 
dition could produce a change in international politics. Germany 
quickly observes what is going on, perhaps congratulates herself on 
the difficulties which press upon the shoulders of the government of 
the Republic, and desires nothing more than not to mix herself up 
with this question as long as she will not be forced to it by her eco- 
nomic interests. 

England, which has pushed France into the Moroccan muddle, 
contemplates her work with satisfaction. Remains Spain. She is 
naturally not very well satisfied with the development which the 
procedure of France takes. She must recognize with regret that her 
means are far behind her ambitions and has to make a pleasant 
face to a bad play. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 68 

Berlin, May 1, 1911. 
Baron Greindl. 

Baron Greindl forwards under this date nothing but the trans- 
lation of the leading article in the "North German Gazette" on the 
French-Moroccan entaglement, but at the end he emphatically re- 
iterates that "French newspapers show much too plainly that the 
real reason of all is : the making of a second Tunis out of Morocco. 

GREINDL. 

No. 69 

London, May 9, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

Count Lalaing reports from London with what interest as well 
as apprehension, the French campaign in Morocco is followed. Os- 
tensibly there seems to be a great deal of apprehension that France 
might act thoughtlessly somewhere and give Germany thereby an 
opportunity for intervention. 

But at the same time, one is far from believing that the German 
Government wanted war. One is convinced that the Emperor does 
not want it ; but the question is whether the Berlin Cabinet might not, 
under certain circumstances, be led into temptation of making itself 
noticeable by some intervention or other, and of giving in this way 
a striking proof of its power which would be humiliating to the French 
Government and unpleasant to England and Russia. 

An occupation of Fez, which, by way of example, awakened alto- 
gether too much the semblance of a final one, or a misdemeanor 
against the spirit if not the letter of the obligations entered into in 
Algeciras, might offer Berlin an opportunity for intervention. 

LALAING. 

39 



No. 70 

Berlin, May 10, 1911. 
Baron Greindl. 

You will have read the news in certain papers, which were put 
into circulation by a recently established news agency, according to 
which Germany intended sending three cruisers into the Moroccan 
waters. You have, no doubt, also read the high official denial in the 
"North German Gazette," which denounces this invention as a dan- 
gerous mischief, of which every half-way politically thinking man 
must say what an enormous responsibility he takes upon himself 
when he launches such freely invented sensational news on so serious 
a question as the Moroccan. 

Baron Greindl then discusses the situation at length and refers, 
especially, to the contemplative attitude of Germany, which is begin- 
ning to iDecome more and more disturbing to the French as they are 
getting themselves deeper and deeper into the Moroccan mire. Greindl 
in speaking of the complaining French Envoy to Berlin (Jules Cam- 
bon, a brother of the French Envoy to London) says: "Does he ex- 
pect, then, to get a sort of open information in full? If one had any 
such hopes in Paris, one must have lost sight of the beginning of 
the question. It began with the agreement between England, France 
and Spain in 1904 when no one took the trouble of consulting the 
other interested powers or even of informing them. Up to the moment 
when Germany raised her objections, it was openly avowed that 
Morocco would become a second Tunis." Aside from the public 
understanding, France formed a secret treaty with Spain (a but poorly 
protected secret) about the division of the Sherefic Empire. The 
compact of Algeciras changed nothing of the original French plans, 
only it was necessary to obtain, slowly and step by step, that which 
had been expected by one fell stroke. Little by little the French 
took possession of everything there, and made use of every oppor- 
tunity which offered itself to them, to proceed to occupation of ter- 
ritories so far as they had not induced it themselves. 

"I remain further convinced that Germany aims to avoid being 
forced into a serious intervention in the Moroccan afifair, but I have 
to repeat what I wrote in my report of May 1st and that is: That 
the question is nevertheless an extremely ticklish one. It is even 
becoming more so; in order that the Imperial Government may be 
able to justify its inactivity before the German public opinion, it will 
be necessary for France to operate very cleverly and to simulate 
moderation, not to force it from this attitude. Recently, however, 
neither the French Government nor a large part of the French press 
have acted correspondingly." 

GREINDL. 

No. 71 

London, May 22. 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

This report of Count Lalaing records the visit of the German 
Emperor and Empress in London, and describes the difference be- 
tween this and the last visit in November. 1907. During the latter 

40 



visit, a cold mistrust had characterized the attitude of the people; 
on this occasion the sentiment was more cordial. The absence of 
all military display greatly contributed to the cordiality. 

The death of King Edward appears to have brought about a 
lessened tension in the German-English relations. It appears that 
at the time of the Ententes, with which the deceased sovereign was 
so enamoured, the people themselves were conscious of the endeavor 
to encircle Germany, an endeavor which the London Cabinet so often 
encouraged, and necessarily disgruntled the Berlin Cabinet. One 
was somewhat afraid of the possible consequences, and from fear to 
hatred there is but a step. The Anti-German press never failed to 
see to it that the step was made. 

It would appear, however, that the public began to collect itself 
a little, and just at a most propitious moment there appeared William 
II, without any glittering accoutrements, in ordinary citizen's dress 
and escorted the Empress and the Princess with the children of the 
Royal English House through the streets of London. The result was 
excellent, even if it only lasted for a moment. 

The grandchild of Queen Victoria need not regret the step he 
made under such favorable conditions. 



No. 72 



LALAING. 



Berlin, June 17, 19n. 



Baron Greindl. 

As far as can be judged, the attitude of Germany has not changed 
in regard to the Moroccan affair. The rumor that Spain had been 
supported by Germany in her military action was immediately denied. 
That was scarcely necessary. Neither at the time of the conclusion 
of the secret treaties nor by the transactions, has Germany had any 
reason to be satisfied with the attitude of the Spanish Government. 
It was improbable in the highest degree that Germany should go 
into action to defend the interests of Spain, when she did not find it 
expedient to do it for the sake of her own interests. 

On the other hand. Monsieur Cambon takes the trouble, day 
by day, as Herr Zimmermann told me yesterday, of explaining that 
there was an essential difYerence between the French and the Spanish 
actions in Morocco. The one was a flagrant rupture of the Algeciras 
acts, whereas the other was only their execution." The Under Sec- 
retary of State (Zimmerman) told me: "I am listening to these ex- 
planations very seriously," and to emphasize that he spoke ironically 
he quickly added that it was really refreshing to listen to the plaidoy- 
ers in this process of falsehoods. 

The German Government stands pat in its viewpoint. It plays 
the role of a simple spectator and reserves its freedom of action in 
case that the fundamental principles of the Algeciras acts, that is, 
the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of Morocco should 
cease to exist as a consequence of the French intervention. 

To-day already, there is nothing more left of it. When will Ger- 
many deem the moment as having come that she should express it 
and what use will she make of the liberty which she has regained? 

41 



I have now as ever the conviction that Germany's chief concern 
is to avoid a war, which Morocco is not worth, and which France 
can save Europe from, that she proceeds with as much dissimulation 
as is necessary not to put the German public opinion into an uproar. 

GREINDL. 

No. 73 

Paris, July 2, 1911. 
Baron Guillaume. 

I need not inform you that the news of the dispatch of a German 
warship to Agadir, which became known here last night, is occupy- 
ing the Parisian press exclusively. The incident is evidently serious ; 
it may acquire extraordinary significance unless it is the result of 
an understanding between the Cabinets of Berlin and London. 

For a long time it had been considered as a firmly established 
principle, that England would never permit any foothold of the Ger- 
mans at any point of the Moroccan territory. In case that this policy 
had been abandoned, what had been the provision with which it had 
been paid for? 

After further consideration of this event. Baron Guillaume states: 
That Monsieur Jaures was triumphing to-day. (Jaures, a Socialist 
leader, was assassinated at the beginning of the war, 1914.) 

Jaures has always thrown it up to the Government that it was 
compromising itself in this hateful Moroccan affair; he has always 
maintained the opinion that no necessity for the march upon Fez had 
ever existed and that the advance of the French Army might be the 
source of serious difficulties. 

To-day it is incontestable that the landing of the Spaniards in 
Larasch and the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir has been 
induced, or made possible, by the attitude of the French Government. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 74 

London, July 5, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

Count Lalaing reports on the sensation which the sending of a 
German warship to Agadir had produced in London, and that it had 
been akin to that which the occupation of Fez by French troops and 
the appearance of Spanish battalions at Larasch had produced at 
the time. The English press is not satisfied with Germany's pro- 
ceeding, denies the existence of any unrest in the region of Agadir 
and speculates already on the possibility of a division of Morocco, 
whereby there or elsewhere an indemnity for the German Empire 
would have to be found. 

Count Lalaing further dwells upon the difficulties of the situa- 
tion for not only the Prime Minister, Asquith, but also that of Sir 
Edward Grey, who would have to make some explanations in the 
Lower House. It is not desirable to disturb the German relations 
which recently have improved ; on the other hand, it must not have 
the appearance of not standing by France. 

LALAING. 
42 



No. 75 

Paris, July 8, 1911. 
Baron Guillaume. 

Giiillaume reports the return of the President and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic from their visit to the Nether- 
lands. He states that it will soon be known in which manner the 
Government of the Republic will reply to the information by the 
Berlin Cabinet on account of German intervention in Morocco. 

He says that people are not lacking who think that the attitude 
of the Paris Cabinet had not been very large-minded, and that the 
emphasis with which it had been pointed out, that France without 
asking Russia or England could not have reached a decision, had been 
very little worthy of the role of a Great Power. 

One wished to gain time, one asked advice right and left, and, 
eventually, turned, thanks to Delcasse's anglomania, to Great Britain. 
I have reason for the assumption that Monsieur Caillaux (the new 
French Premier) has already reached the point of regretting the 
emphatic manner with which this step had been taken and the atti- 
tude which the Cabinet of St. James had assumed. There is a great 
deal less chance of reaching an understanding with Germany, if Eng- 
land participates in the conversation, and I am of the firm conviction 
that both Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn which their predeces- 
sors have given to the Moroccan question : They were quite ready 
to give in, provided it could be done without humiliation. 

GUILLAUME. 
No. 76 

London, July 8, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

In addition to his letter of May 5th, Count Lalaing reports a 
part of the speech which the English Prime Minister, Asquith, made 
in the Lower House. In it Asquith says that the recent events in 
Moroccan affairs have created a new situation, but is convinced that 
diplomacy will solve the difficult problem and that he would see to 
it that the English interests would be protected and the obligations 
to France carried out. 

Lalaing then says : It is interesting to state that Mr. Asquith 
lays stress upon the new situation, which could indirectly influence 
the interests of England. The thought that Agadir could become, 
by certain eventualities, a basis for the German fleet is apt to disturb 
the Government of the United Kingdom. 

The press reminds that Great Britain has disinterested herself 
in the Moroccan question in favor of France, because the Republic 
on her part had left England a free hand in Egypt, but that England 
had never contemplated permitting Germany to gain a foothold in 
Morocco. 

LALAING. 
No. 77 

Paris, July 24, 1911. 
Baron Guillaume. 

So far the Cabinets of Berlin and Paris have not made any official 
announcement of their "conversation" and one has to be satisfied 

43 



with press notices, most of which are only tentative, and others may- 
be inspired merely as trial balloons. It may, however, be well to 
infer, since the oft-repeated rumor has never been denied, that Ger- 
many demands of France a "compensation" on the African coast in 
the Congo. The French newspapers protest against it, and allege that 
they could not understand why the Imperial Government should de- 
mand a compensation. 

To those who admit that France went to Fez without any seri- 
ous grounds, it is clear that she scarcely will come out of it again, 
or if she does, that she may find herself forced to return there, and 
that she breaks in this way the spirit of the contract of Algeciras. 
If Germany, in the face of these facts, demands any compensation, it 
means that she will not force any retreat of France, but also that 
she herself has no intention of settling herself in Agadir. But she 
is of the opinion that the French Government has disturbed all agreed 
equilibrium of the powers and demands her share. 

As soon as the news of the dispatch of a German cruiser to Agadir 
became known, I had the honor of writing to you that, in my opinion, 
the kernel of the question was to find out how the proceeding would 
be received in London, and I reminded you that Great Britain had 
never admitted the possibility of Germany taking the least possession 
on the Moroccan coast. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 78 

London, July 24, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

From the article in the "Times" of July 20th, to which I had the 
honor of calling your attention, you have been able to draw a picture 
of how much the suppositious demands of Germany have been exag- 
gerated. A member of the Cabinet also, the impulsive Secretary of 
the Treasury has played upon them in a speech at a banquet in the 
city. After expressing his sympathy for the principles of the Court 
of Appeal and his best wishes for a favorable result of the negotiations 
which Sir Edward Grey had opened with the United States, Mr. Lloyd 
George added that, in his opinion, Great Britain would have to uphold 
her prestige as a World Power at any price. In order to maintain 
peace, one could afford to make some sacrifice, but England would 
have to pay too dearly if she should be considered as not having any 
significance in the Concert of the Powers. 

COUNT LALAING. 

No. 79 

Paris, July 28. 1911. 
Baron Guillaume. 

Yesterday I had the opportunity of meeting several of my col- 
leagues and, especially, those who are usually best informed. They 
admitted not having any exact knowledge of the status of the pend- 
ing negotiations on account of Morocco. Never was a secret so 
carefully guarded, never was secrecy so absolute, France will not and 
cannot wish that the negotiations fail completely. Her Government 

44 



knows that war would mean the last hour of the Republic. I have 
the greatest confidence in the peaceful inclinations of Emperor 
William, notwithstanding certain exaggerations in his demeanor 
which are not infrequent. He is not going to let himself be carried 
any further than he will by the overflowing temperament and the 
heavy hand of his exceedingly smart Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Secretary of State v. Kiderlen-Waechter.) 

And so it has been always. 

Germany can just as little go to war on account of Morocco as to 
enforce the bill of compensation, the payment of which she desires 
because of the more or less final occupation of the Fez by the French. 

In general I have very little confidence in the peaceful intentions 
of Great Britain, which rather likes to see when the others are swal- 
lowing each other. But in this case it would be dififtcult for England 
— nay, I might say impossible, not to intervene with arms. 

Just as I accepted it from the very first day, the crucial point 
of the situation is in London. Only there it can become serious. The 
French will give in all points to keep peace. Not so the English who 
will not recede from certain principles and demands. But it is not 
desirable to drive them to the utmost. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 80. 

Paris, August 10, 1911. 
Baron Guillaume. 

In my report of July 8 I had the honor of writing you that 
according to my informations, Monsieur Caillaux had exceedingly 
regretted, that the Government had so emphatically insisted of getting 
its cue for its attitude on the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir 
in London ; and that, at the time, he had in no way approved of the 
attitude assumed by the Cabinet of St. James. 

This information seems to be verified. I have been assured that 
England, at first hand, proposed to France that both Governments 
should dispatch at once two warships each to Agadir. The Paris 
Cabinet had offered the liveliest resistance to this proposition, and, 
there it had remained. 

France has the good fortune of being represented in Berlin and 
London by two of its ablest diplomats, the Brothers Cambon, etc., etc. 

GUILLAUME. 
No. 81. 

Berlin, October 12, 1911. 
Baron Guillaume. 

That part of the German-French agreement, as far as it relates to 
Morocco itself, was made public by von Kiderlen-Waechter and Mon- 
sieur Cambon yesterday at noon. A high official communication of 
the "North German Gazette" announced the fact on the same evening. 

The opimism of the Secretary of State was therefore justified. It 
is hoped that it will be equally so for that part of the transactions 
which are now beginning and which concern the territorial compen- 
sations demanded by Germany. 

45 



The tone of the French press fills me in this respect with serious 
apprehension. With a daily increasing vehemence, it is arming itself 
against any reduction of the present French colonial possessions, and 
appears to have completely lost sight of the real status of the question. 
In Berlin one regards the informations given to the French press as 
untimely and regrettable but one does not deny them. In the main, at 
least, they will have to be regarded as correct. In accordance with it, 
Germany would have received the assurance of free trade in Morocco 
on equal footing with France and the other interested countries. This 
was offered her already by the Treaty of Algeciras in confirmation of 
that of Madrid. These international conclusions guaranteed her be- 
sides the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of the Moroccan 
territory. Actually there exists neither the one nor the other of these 
promises any longer, but, theoretically, they still continue to exist. 
Germany concedes a great deal to France when she relinquishes them 
by her acquiescence to the establishment of a French protectorate 
over Morocco. The Imperial Government has apparently taken pre- 
cautions that the Berlin promises should be kept better than those 
of Algeciras which were being systematically violated from the very 
first day. The agreement to these conditions is not a French conces- 
sion, as one likes to believe it to be in Paris, at most, it is a limita- 
tion of the German concessions. Germany alone has made such 
heretofore. 

The French are now in line to make concessions which must 
consist in the secession of the promised territory. The Parisian news- 
papers seem to have forgotten entirely, that both parts of the planned 
treaty are indissolubly bound together, but, here one is, undoubtedly, 
not willing to separate them from each other. 

GREINDL. 



No. 82. 

London, November 18, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

When I returned in September to my post, I heard from various 
sources that the general political situation had been regarded a few 
weeks ago as sufficiently serious to cause the English Government to 
take extraordinary precautions. I am informed from absolutely re- 
liable sources that the officers of the active army had suddenly been 
recalled from their furlough at that time, that the purchase of horses 
for the cavalry was taking place and that the squadron of the North 
Sea had temporarily been put in readiness for war. 

Several delegates had insisted in the Chamber that the Govern- 
ment should enlighten the nation as to what had occurred this sum- 
mer between the Cabinets of London, Berlin and Paris, for after the 
publicity of the famous speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Mr. Lloyd George, the Parliament had not received any further in- 
formation. 

LALAING. 

46 



No. 83. 

London, November 28, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

This letter reports on the speech of Sir Edward Grey which had 
been awaited with considerable impatience in London, Berlin and 
Paris, and which, eventually, showed the suspicious and arrogant 
attitude of Sir Grey in an unmistakable manner. The speech dealt 
chiefly with the Moroccan question but, eventually, it included Persia 
and Tripoli. Grey, of course, gave his English version, which, as he 
states and as had to be expected, differs not immaterially from the 
German. Lalaing says: "The German representation may be com- 
prised in a few words. On June 30th Germany informed the powers 
which had signed the Treaty of Algeciras, of the dispatch of the 
'Panther' to Agadir for the purpose of protecting the German sub- 
jects and which were being menaced by the natives there. The Im- 
perial Government had no intention of territorial conquests. On the 
21st of July, Sir Edward Grey begged information of Count Met- 
ternich as to the length of the presence of the gun boat. He added 
that in case of the German-French negotiations should miscarry, the 
question of Agadir would become acute, and demanded that England 
should participate in the negotiations. The German demand appeared 
to be unacceptable to France. 

On the same evening July 21st consequently before the meeting 
between Sir Edward Grey and Count Metternich in Berlin could have 
been known, Mr. Lloyd George made his famous speech which made 
a disagreeable impression upon the Imperial Government. 

The German Government instructed its Ambassador on the 24th 
to declare that Germany was not contemplating the acquisition of ter- 
ritory in Morocco, but desired that Sir Edward Grey should refrain 
from speaking of it before the Chamber, so as not to create the im- 
pression as if the German Government had receded from such inten- 
tions on account of the menacing tone of Lloyd George. 

Count Lalaing now proceeds to give the English version of the 
Moroccan question and directly charges the British Prime Minister 
with intentional misinterpretation of Germany's aversions ; in fact, 
he plainly indicates that Prime Minister lied. 

Sir Grey's English presentation : "According to him the German 
presentation is incomplete. From a verbal communication of the Ger- 
man Ambassador on July 1st, he concluded that the German Cabinet 
by the dispatch of a gunboat to Agadir contemplated a division of 
Morocco. (Sir Edward Grey does not seem to have understood that 
the vessel had only transiently sojourned in Agadir.) On July 4th, 
Sir Grey told Count Metternich that new complications had arisen 
which affected the English interests which would be probed in the 
Ministerial Council. Later on the press announced that Germany 
had made unacceptable propositions to France in regard to the French 
Congo and on July 21st the English Minister informed the Ambassa- 
dor that the presence of a German ship in Agadir would be disturbing 
on account of the possibility that the pending German-French nego- 
tiations might be broken. On the same day, Lloyd George made his 
speech, and simply said that as soon as English interests were at 

47 



stake, the English Government could not be regarded inconsequenti- 
ally. On the day that an English Chancellor could no longer use such 
language, England would no longer be a great nation." 

In view of the tone of the German disclosures, Sir Edward Grey 
was of the opinion that it would not be compatible with the dignity 
of the British Government to make explanations about the speech 
of Lloyd George. 

From the polemic over the German and English representation in 
the consultations between Count Metternich and Sir Edward Grey, 
it appears that the latter did not at once understand, on July 1st, that 
Germany promised to recall her warship as soon as order had been 
established again in Morocco, and that this promise according to 
German conception had been equivalent with the declaration that the 
German Government did not aspire to the establishment of a base of 
fleet in Agadir. Sir Edward Grey contends that he had received this 
assurance only on July 24th. 

LALAING. 
No. 84. 

London, November 30th, 1911. 
Count Lalaing. 

In his capacity as Chief of the Opposition Party in the Upper 
House, Lord Lansdowne declared himself as being satisfied with the 
speech of Sir Edward Grey. The liberal Lord Courtney of Penrith, 
a friend of Germany, attacked the policy of the Government, because 
it had in view the isolation of Germany. (This truth is seldom heard 
in the English Parliament) and because it had not stood by the acts 
of Algeciras. Sir Edward Grey should have restrained the Parisian 
Cabinet, as it had held the determination of these international acts 
too highly. Then the friction with Berlin would have been avoided, 
and, in all probability the Italian Expedition to Tripoli would never 
have taken place. Blind indulgence toward the French intentions 
had brought about the regrettable tension with Germany. 

These truths have, by no means been to the taste of the House 
of Lords. 

But one part of Lord Lansdowne's speech is noteworthy, namely, 
that the given promise of a simple diplomatic support might readily 
lead to another kind of help (real military or maritime). 

One need only read between the lines to understand that in the 
opinion of Lord Lansdowne, one of its founders, one could declare 
the "Entente cordiale," without its being an alliance, eventually as 
operating as a consummated treaty of defense between the two 
countries. 



No. 85. 



LALAING. 



Berlin, December 6, 1911. 



Count Lalaing. 

In his report Baron Greindl refers to the bad impression which 
Sir Edward Grey's speech had made in Germany. These impressions 
are lasting. But the German Chancellor had succeeded in avoiding 

48 



in his own speeches everything- which might have injured public 
opinion in Eng-land. He made allusions to the fact that the agree- 
ment with France would reflect favorably upon the relations between 
England and Germany. 

In short and discreet form the wish was herewith expressed to 
bury the hatchet and begin a new era of good relations between the 
two countries. 

"It was positively impossible to reject the advances of von Beth- 
mann-Holweg without, so to speak, demolishing glass windows. Mr. 
Asquith and the leader of the opposition, Mr. Bonar Law, have ac- 
cepted it in a friendly manner. Sir Edward Grey endeavored to be 
correct, but displayed a noticeable coolness, but, anyhow he said that 
he would be prepared to do everything in his power to improve the 
English-German relations. The existing friendship of Great Britain, 
to whom he intended to remain faithful, prevented him from forming 
new friendships. Far away from any intention of disturbing the 
recent transactions between Germany and France, he had, on the 
contrary, rejoiced over the accomplished understanding. He under- 
stood the necessity of expansion of Germany and had no intention of 
putting obstacles in her way. He even indicated the territory upon 
which the German colonial expansion could take place. It is in Africa 
where England does not think of extending her possessions. ("Are 
they perhaps our possessions which he intends to juggle away accord- 
ing to the principles of the new international law and it is interpreted 
in London, and, unfortunately, also elsewhere?) in Morocco, Tripoli, 
Persia. As Sir Edward Grey said he did not believe in any plans 
of Germany inimical to England. England had just as little any 
inimical intentions toward Germany and he would not give any sup- 
port to a third power whose attitude was inimical or challenging. 

If Sir Edward Grey had stopped right here, it would have been 
excellent, but his whole speech was permeated by an undisguised 
sentiment of distrust toward Germany, and his utterances were weak- 
ened by reservations which completely annulled their significance. So, 
for instance, he put up as a condition for the approachment with Ger- 
many the demand that his two French and Russian friends should 
be included, as if it was not generally known that no French Govern- 
ment would risk lending itself to any such attempts, which would, at 
once, be declined by French public opinion. 

The attention of the German press centered itself exclusively upon 
those parts of the speech in which the leader of the Foreign Ofiice 
manifested his unshakeable intention of continuing the policy of the 
"Entente cordiale," which later on grew to be a Triple Entente, which 
had been inaugurated by King Edward VII, with the help of the Con- 
servative Party and whose heirloom the Liberals have taken over. 
Sir Edward Grey declared that there existed, outside of the public 
agreement, no secret treaty between England and France. I do not 
doubt his sincerity, but it is nevertheless true that either with or 
without written or verbal obligations everybody in England or France 
considers the "Entente cordiale" as a defensive as well as ofifensive 
compact against Germany. This corresponds exactly with the char- 
acter which the deceased King of England had meant to give it. The 

49 



"Entente cordiale" has not been built upon the positive foundation 
of a defense of common interests but upon the negative one of hatred 
against the German Empire. If it had been conceived differently in 
Paris, it would not have been accepted there as such an important 
diplomatic success which thereby could even extinguish the humilia- 
tion of Faschoda. The "Entente cordiale" has reawakened in France 
the slumbering ideas of revenge. From it arises also the state of 
unrest and uncomfortable feeling in which Europe has found itself 
during the last seven years. Sir Edward Grey has adopted this tra- 
dition without reservation. He thinks it is in consonance with Eng- 
lish interests. He believes no longer in the old system of "Splendid 
isolation," and the majority of the English people side with him. 
The conservatives and liberals approve of his attitude and only the 
working party and radicals criticise it. 

For the present it must be regarded as fixed that in London the 
plan has taken root to come to the aid of France in a war against 
Germany by the landing of a corps of 150.000 English. Herein lies 
nothing surprising. It is only the continuation of similar propositions, 
which were made to General Ducarne a few years ago by Colonel 
Bernadiston, likewise the continuation of the Flushing intrigue. 

Sir Edward Grey has just as little succeeded to prove that the 
speech of Lloyd George in the Mansion House had not been a chal- 
lenge and a threat. 

Von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his address on November 9th, made 
the task easier for Sir Grey by referring to this speech as a dinner 
toast which had received significance only through English and 
French press comments. 

Sir Edward Grey found it proper to let it be known that the 
toast had been neither an impressive improvisation nor the personal 
opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that, indeed, the text 
had been discussed and agreed upon between the Prime Minister and 
himself. 

Should the agreement really have been made easier that England 
would butt in to a conference about Morocco, where she had re- 
nounced all political demands, or was it an attempt to intervene in 
favor of France? 

Did it not mean perhaps to arrogate a right of veto against Ger- 
many's enterprises when one shrieks blood and murder because a 
German cruiser dropped anchor at the wharf of Agadir, while Eng- 
land, without batting an eye, looked complacently on the progressive 
conquest of Moroccan territory by France and Spain under the de- 
struction of the independence of the Sultan? England could not act 
otherwise. She was bound to France by her secret treaty. The ex- 
planation is very simple but. by no means, suited to allay the dis- 
turbance in Germany. From all this, it is perfectly clear that at the 
moment of signing the Algeciras acts, at least three of the powers 
concerned in it entered into an agreement which was not compatible 
with the promises which they had published. Those are the accusa- 
tions of the German people against England as the press puts them 
in to expression. The Foreign Office had every means at command of 
informing itself of the fact that Germany only desired to secure better 

50 



the principle of the open door in the interest of all powers, England 
included, and to obtain a territorial compensation in Equatorial Africa, 
which, as Sir Edward Grey declared, did not interest him. The 
English Secretary of State would have saved himself the trouble, of 
which he spoke, if he had placed a little more confidence in the infor- 
mation which had been made to him at the moment of the dispatch of 
the "Panther" to Agadir. The silence, which followed and of which 
Sir Edward Grey complains, was a mutual one. It would never have 
evoked so much excitement if it had not been broken by the sensa- 
tional toast of a prominent member of the English Cabinet. 

Sir Edward Grey says England could not permit that a question, 
which affected her interests, could be regulated without her partici- 
pation. Von Bethmann-Hollweg replies that Germany had never 
thought of disputing it. but that Germany demanded the same con- 
siderations for herself. The difficulties of the Moroccan affairs had 
arisen from the fact that England and France had wanted to regulate 
them without caring in the least about the German interests. Now,, 
the crisis had passed ; the Chancellor joins the English Prime Minister 
in the wishes of seeing the re-establishment of friendly relations be- 
tween the two countries. It would, however, be necessary that Eng- 
land should adjust her policy to these wishes. The expansion of 
Germany is a fact with which the other nations would have to count. 
Nothing could hinder it. An experience of forty years had shown 
what the German policy desired. The strength of the Empire was 
a pledge of peace because it prevented the picking of a quarrel with it. 

GREINDL. 

No. 86. 

Berlin, December 9, 1911. 
Baron Greindl. 

Sir Edward Grey has, at Plymouth, briefly replied to the speech 
which the German Chancellor had made in the Reichstag on the 
German-English relations. 

Baron Greindl voices his opinion of the reply as follows: That 
which stands forth plainest in the speech of Sir Edward Grey is : that 
he intends to continue the policy of the "Triple Entente" in the same 
spirit with which he has conducted it so far and that is in the German 
hostile sense.' 

The address of von Bethmann-Hollweg is no less clear, he is by 
no means disposed to recognize the right of veto which England 
arrogates to herself toward the German enterprises and that he does 
expect for an approachment of the English Government not words 
but deeds. 

Between the two peoples there exists just as little mutual under- 
standing as between the two governments. The English continue to 
regard the expansion of Germany with jealous looks. The German 
was, by no means, hostile to the English six months ago. But he has 
become so now. The relations have, consequently, returned to the 
point of frigid correctness where they were before the crisis. They 
have become worse and as I fear for a long time to come. 

GREINDL. 

51 



No. 87. 

London, January 15, 1912. 
Count Lalaing. 

County Lalaing reports on the effect which the French Ministerial 
crisis had produced in England, and refers to the fact that Monsieur 
Caillaux had evidently endeavored to enter into negotiations with 
Germany with a view of favoring the latter with far reaching con- 
cessions. These disclosures, naturally, could not help but produce 
rather painful admissions that the loyalty of the English Cabinet, as 
far as it could be sincere, had somewhat miscarried. Lalaing says of 
it: "No one cares today to admit that one has been, apparently, more 
popish than the pope, and more irreconcilable than the friend whom 
one wished to help." It is distinctly disagreeable to have been made 
a fool of, even only for a short while. Lalaing further reports that 
there are a number of newspapers which assert that Sir Edward Grey 
had played a short sighted policy in taking such an attitude with a 
government (meaning the French) which might have brought about 
war. These occurrences are now being exploited by those publicists 
who are doubting the value of the "Entente Cordiale," they will also 
furnish proof to that small group of writers which contended that 
it would have been more advantageous for England if she had, with- 
out breaking the friendly relations with France, entertained more 
friendly ones toward Germany. 

"The Entente, which was, solely and alone, intended to dispel 
certain sharply defined clouds, was not a treaty. The mistake of the 
government of Mr. Asquith was to actually consider it such with the 
results that by it had arisen in Berlin a serious antagonism toward 
Great Britain." 

LALAING. 

No. 88. 

Berlin, February 9, 1912. 
Count Lalaing. 

Count Lalaing reports the departure from England of the Min- 
ister of War. Lord Haldane, for Berlin and the speculations as to 
the reasons for it : 

1. An exchange of views on the German-English mobilization. 

2. To ask the pardoning of a recently condemned English spy 
by the name of Stewart. 

3. To bring about a German-English Entente. 

4. To bring about a division of the Portuguese Colonies. 

5. On account of boundary adjustment in Africa. 

6. To cede Whale Bay to Germany. 

7. Or finally, to deliver a personal message of King George to 
Emperor William. 

Whatever the reason, the real aim is a friendly one. Of all English 
Ministers, the War Minister is the friendliest to Germany. Lord 
Haldane had studied at Heidelberg, speaks German fluently and has 
lots of personal friends in Berlin. 

LALAING. 

52 



No. 89. 

London, February 13, 1912. 
Count Lalaing. 

It is interesting to state how unpopular Sir Edward Grey has 
become with the extreme left of his party. The "Daily News" says 
that present events proved how little faith could be placed in the 
promises of the leader of the Foreign Office, and that from now on. 
Sir Edward Grey had made himself impossible as such." 

The same paper takes today a speech of Lord Rosebery's in 
Glasgow as an incentive to further attacks upon Sir Edward Grey. 
In this speech Lord Rosebery criticises the foreign policy of Great 
Britain with its tangled Entente system, which brings about such 
heavy responsibilities. The paper regrets the results of the policy of 
the Minister which opposes the "Triple Entente" to the Triple Alli- 
ance," which hinders the development of Germany and which had 
brought the country to the verge of war during the previous summer. 
Consequently Sir Edward Grey's policy had to bring Great Britain 
to the necessity of not only augmenting the fleet but also of intro- 
ducing compulsory military service. On this account the "Daily 
News" demands Sir Edward Grey's resignation. 

LALAING. 

No. 90. 

London, February 16, 1920. 
Count Lalaing, 

In this letter, Count Lalaing reports the results of the visit of the 
Minister of War, Lord Haldane, to Germany, and that Mr. Asquith 
had confirmed the impression that the main reason for the visit had 
been to establish a more friendly exchange, and to lessen the existing 
tension between the two countries. It was natural to suppose that 
such an object could be much easier accomplished by the visit of an 
English Cabinet Minister to Germany. 

The Premier bethought himself to add that even if the two na- 
tions had the desire of seeing better relations arise between them, it 
did not concern itself, by any means, to change the special relation, 
Germany's and Great Britain's, toward other powers ; but both states 
proved at the time what might possibly happen. 

LALAING. 

No. 91. 

Berlin. April 26. 1912. 
Baron Greindl. 

This report, evidently the last of Baron Greindl's, deals with the 
transactions in the Reichstag on proposals for armaments. It is not 
important, and therefore, omitted. 

Evidently Baron Greindl was replaced as Ambassador by Baron 
Beyens. 

No. 92. 

Berlin, June 28, 1912. 
Baron Beyens, Belgian Anxbassador in Berlin. 

Will Baron von Marshall, in the course of his London mission,, 
.succeed in bringing about an approachment of the German and British 

53 



Governments? Undoubtedly, no one desires this any more than the 
Emperor. One is bound to acceed to his Majesty in all justice that 
he never permits an opportunity to escape without addressing publicly 
a few gracious or flattering words to the English. The recent regattas 
in Kiel afforded him twice an occasion to praise the British Navy. 

The English Ambassador appeared to me to be rather skeptical 
in regard to the result of the mission. "What makes the re-estab- 
lishment of the former amicable understanding so difficult," Sir 
Edward Goschen said, "is the fact that between the two nations exists 
no real ground for irritation or estrangement. With Germany, we 
did not have to regulate so painful an incident, as that of Fashoda. 
The misunderstandings arose at the time of the Krueger telegram by 
the Emperor. That was for us like an enlightenment, which showed 
us the abyss, which opened in all silence and without our noticing it, 
between ourselves and the German people. 

"The question of restriction of the German Navy is not solvable. 
We have no kind of right to force such upon the Imperial Govern- 
ment. We simply have to follow her upon the road to ruin, for Eng- 
land's welfare depends upon her preponderance at sea. 

"Another, perhaps deeper lying reason for the repellent attitude 
of the English people against the German, Sir Edward Goschen has 
passed over in silence, namely; the competition in the fields of indus- 
try and commerce. With easily understood envy, England sees how a 
European people in competition in the world's market is gaining 
ground year by year, and, therefore, in this respect also menaces the 
position of world power which she had secured for herself." 

Although the German products do not possess as yet the same 
quality, they attain gradually the value of the English wares of the 
same kind, the price of which has remained higher ; therefore, the 
mark of origin "Made in Germany," and introduced by the British 
Government, has, apparently, brought about the fact that in the Eng- 
lish Colonies today the German wares are preferred to those of the 
motherland on account of their seductive cheapness. 

BEYENS. 

No. 93. 

Berlin, October 18, 1912. 
Baron Beyens. 

The relations between France and Germany did not exactly im- 
prove during last summer. The first result of the Balkan crisis was 
an approach between the Imperial Government and the French Re- 
public. Actuated by the mutual desire of localizing the conflict in 
the Balkan Peninsula and avoiding a European war, they agreed to 
influence for the same purpose their respective allies, Russia and 
Austria, and participated at the same time in the measures which 
had been undertaken in Constantinople and the capitals of the Balkan 
countries. 

It was not the fault of the Imperial Government that the crisis 
of 1909, brought about the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, 
did not find a better solution. Germany had offered to the Parisian 
Cabinet to mutually intervene in St. Petersburg with the object of 

54 



causing Russia to take a different attitude. Only after Monsieur 
Pichon had declined this mutual step, the Berlin Cabinet decided in 
favor of the well-known step, that is, unconditional intervention for 
Austria. I deem it useful to restate the truth about this historical 
fact. I have heard it a few days ago at the French Ambassy. 

BEYENS. 

No. 94. 

Berlin, October 24, 1912. 
Baron Beyens. 

The French Ambassador who must have particular grounds for 
his words has told me repeatedly that the greatest danger for the 
maintenance of the European peace was the lack of discipline and 
personal politics of the Russian representatives in foreign countries. 
They are nearly all red-hot pan-Slavists, and upon them, for the most 
part, must be shouldered the responsibility for the present events. 
They will, no doubt, secretly influence their country to an interven- 
tion in the Balkan conflict. 

BEYENS. 

No. 95. 

London. October 31, 1912. 
Count Lalaing. 

Count Lalaing states in this report that yesterday one of the 
numerous meetings presided over by the former Ambassador to Ber- 
lin, Sir Frank Lascelles, had taken place in the Guildhall. These meet- 
ings are held by the society to bring about a better German-EngHsh 
understanding. But Lalaing says that during the previous week, 
Field Marshal Lord Roberts had made a war-like speech which had 
produced considerable sensation. Count Lalaing calls him an old 
man, playing the role of an "enfant terrible." 

Lord Roberts had declared in a dramatic and prophetic tone that 
Germany was only waiting for the moment, when her armaments at 
sea were completed to attack Great Britain, etc., etc. Lalaing says 
that under such, to say the least, unpropitious circumstances, the con- 
ference of the society had taken place, but that the honey-sweet words, 
heard there, would have no effect to efface the impression of the 
vehement sputterings of Lord Roberts from the public mind, sputter- 
ing-s which keep public opinion in a state of continual distrust. 

LALAING. 

No. 96. 

Berlin, November 30, 1912. 

Baron Beyens. 

Even if the voyage of the Arch-duke, successor to the throne 
Austria had been made to Germany under the pretext of a hunting in- 
vitation by the Emperor, it had, nevertheless, this year on account of 
the Balkan War and the conflict between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia, a particular significance. The Arch Duke has declared in 
Berlin that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had gotten to the end 
of concessions which it could make to its neighbor. The Emperor 

55 



and his advisers have, nevertheless, not refrained from councilling- 
moderation, which William II, while bringing his guest to the train, 
comprised in his peculiar and familiar manner of expression, in the 
following expressionful words : "Above all, no foolishness." I can 
vouch for the truthfulness of this advice by the testimony of the 
ambassadors who told it to me, and which escaped the indiscretions 
of the newspapers. There is no doubt that the Emperor, the Chan- 
cellor and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs are passionate adherents 
of peace. Whatever may be the plans of von Kiderlen-Waechter, who 
has big ideas about winning the sympathies of the young Balkan 
powers for his country, one thing is quite certain, namely, he is 
firmly determined to avoid a European conflagration. 

The relations between the German and English Governments are 
better than they have been for a long time, and, according to 
what the French Ambassador assures me, there is also a 
very favorable slackening of the tension between the cabinets 
of Berlin and France for the maintenance of peace going on. To bring 
Austria to the point of showing herself more conciliatory has been 
successful on the part of the Imperial Government, but it alone will 
not suffice to prevent a conflict. The stubborn resistance which Servia 
makes against a decrease of her demands must also be broken. At 
the end of last week a rumor was circulating among the Chancellories 
of Europe, that Monsieur Sazonow had given up the fight against the 
court party which wants to drive Russia into a war, notwithstanding, 
that the bottom of the Russian Empire is undermined by revolution 
and her military preparations are still insufficient. But within the 
last two days, especially since the Czar received the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador in audience, a feeling of confidence has succeeded the 
disturbance of last week. 

BEYENS. 
No. 97. 

Paris, February 14, 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

The new president of the republic is momentarily enjoying a 
popularity in France which was not known to any of his predecessors ; 
only to speak of two of these, the election of Monsieur Loubet was 
received fairly unfriendly by public opinion, and that of Fallieres left 
every one perfectly cold. 

Monsieur Poincare is daily the object of sympathy manifestations, 
etc., etc. 

This popularity has various causes, his election had been cleverly 
managed ; one shows him gratitude for the reason that he operated 
cleverly enough during his ministerial term, to place France in the 
foreground in the European concerts; several times he was fortunate 
in making deep impressions in his addresses. But first in line one 
must recognize, therein the manifestations of that old French Chau- 
vinism, which had quite receded for many long years, but which has 
gained in strength since the events of Agadir. Monsieur Poincare is 
a Lorrainer, and allows no opportunity to pass to remember it. He 
was the co-worker and instigator of the militaristic policy of Monsieur 

Millerand. 

GUILLAUME. 

56 



No. 98. 

Paris, February 19, 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

I saw just now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who told me that 
the international situation had scarcely changed. The Bulgarian army 
is not making any noticeable progress and the conference of Ambas- 
sadors in London finds itself apparently in a kind of marasmus. 

The Vienna Cabinet still remains in all questions which concern 
it, irreconceivable and Russia is energetically defending Servia and 
Montenegro. The German press is wondering about the military 
measures which the French Government intends to make as an answer 
to the army increase by Germany. 

"The newspapers and, especially, the 'Temps' are wrong when 
they, in the discussion of the plans of the French Government, repre- 
sent these as an answer to the measures which had been taken by the 
Germans. Many are only the result of studies made a long time ago. 

The Minister does not regard the measures taken by Germany as 
a hostile act but rather as precautionary measures for the future. Ger- 
many fears of finding herself one of these days, contemporaneously 
involved in combat with Russia and France, and possibly also with 
England, whereas the support which Austria could give her, might 
be very much restricted by the fact that the double monarchy would 
have to face the group of Balkan States. The relations between the 
French Ambassy in Berlin and Wilhelm Strasse continue and are 
excellent. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 99. 

Paris, February 21, 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

The news of the intended appointment of Monsieur Delcasse to 
the Ambassadorship to St. Petersburg, fell yesterday afternoon like a 
bombshell. The papers brought the news at the same with the 
text of the message of the President of the Republic. Was this com- 
ing together intentional? As it appears: Yes. in any case it was well 
noted and exerted a depressing influence upon the Exchange. 

The personality of Monsieur Delcasse is well known and very 
significant. He was the instigator of the Russian-French Treaty, 
and in a still higher degree of the French-English friendship. Is the 
choice of the new ambassador to St. Petersburg to be interpreted 
as a German hostile manifestation? I don't believe it, but, instead, 
I am of the opinion that Monsieur Poincare, as a Lorrainer, rather 
liked to demonstrate his endeavors, of showing himself firm and to 
hold high the flag of his country from the very first day of his high 
office. 

In these turbulent times, in which Europe finds herself, lies the 
danger which the presence of Monsieur Poincare in the Elysee Palace 
ofi:ers. Have not the militaristic, and somewhat chauvinistic instincts 
of the French people been awakened under his ministerial activity? 
In this reversion of sentiment his hand was recognizable ; it must be 
hoped that his political, practical and cool sense will guard him 

57 



against any exaggeration in this direction. The very considerable 
strengthening of the German armament at the moment of Poincare's 
entrance in the Elysee, will augment the danger of the only too 
nationalistic orientation of the French politics. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 100. 

London, February 24, 1913. 
Count Lalaing. 

The great military plans of Germany, and, possibly still more, the 
very rapid and firm response by France, have moved the political 
circles and have agitated the phantasy of the public. Both govern- 
ments are prepared to make considerable financial sacrifices, and are, 
apparently, supported by public opinion in both countries, where the 
socialists, solely and alone, are raising a dissenting voice. 

The English press naturally desires to burden Germany with 
responsibility of the new tension, which arose through her plans and 
could give Europe occasion for new disturbances. 

In the Foreign Office, I have found a more just and more reason- 
able conception prevalent. One sees in the strengthening of the German 
Army less of a provocation but rather a concession, that the military 
situation has been made worse by events and that, therefore, it will 
have to be improved. The Berlin Government has to confess that it 
can no longer count, as before, upon the support with all powers of 
its Austrian ally, since a new power has made its appearance in the 
southeast of Europe in the form of the Balkan Alliance, just in the 
flank of the double monarchy. Far removed, from being able to count 
upon the full support of the Viennese Government in case of need, 
Germany will very likely be compelled to lend it her help. In the case 
of a European War, she would have to face her enemies on two fronts, 
the Russian and the French and, perhaps, to have to weaken her own 
troops in order to help the Austrian Army. Under such conditions, 
one does not find it astounding that the German Empire feels the 
necessity of increasing the number of her army corps. 

LALAING. 

No. 101. 

Paris. March 3. 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

The German Ambassador told me on Saturday : Since the last 
forty-eight hours the political situation has bettered itself ; the lessen- 
ing of the tension is general. One may hope for an early return to 
peace. But what is not improving is the attitude of public opinion in 
France and Germany in regard to the relations between the two 
countries. Among ourselves we are convinced that we have to fear 
an attack by the Republic on account of the reawakening of the 
Chauvinistic spirit; in France one expresses the same apprehensions 
from our side. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin 
both of us. I do not known whereto we shall drift on this dangerous 
road. Can there no one be found with sufficient good will and esteem 
to bring the whole world back again to reason? Everything is the 

58 



more ridiculous, as both governments have shown the friendliest senti- 
ments during the entire crisis through which we are passing and have 
mutually supported each in avoiding the origin of any conflicts. 

Freiherr von Schoen is perfectly right. From my position here, 
1 can scarcely gauge the public opinion of Germany, but I am observ- 
ing daily how the public opinion in France is becoming more and more 
suspicious and chauvinistic. 

One meets only people, who assure you that an early war with 
Germany is certain, nay unavoidable. The most sensible people con- 
tend that it is necessary to arm oneself to the very teeth to frighten 
the opponent and to prevent a war. 

Yesterday evening I met Monsieur Pichon who repeated to me 
the same words : It is necessary to increase the armament still more 
to prevent the war. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 102. 

Berlin, March 18, 1913. 
Baron Beyens. 

The unpleasant conditions of the Balkan States for the consum- 
mation of peace are explicable by the certainty which they have, that 
it is impossible for the Great Powers to force them to their will. The 
wishes of the powers can only be materialized by means of pressure 
upon the Balkan States. Up to now the Unity has ceased as soon as 
it came to go to actual deeds. This is known in Safia, in Belgrade 
and in Athens, and this inactivity of the Great Powers, which appeared 
after the first victories of the allies, encouraged them to show them- 
selves arrogant and irreconcilable. 

They are also being encouraged, herein, by the double faced 
attitude of Russia. The representatives of the Balkan States in Berlin 
make today no more secret of the close connections which their gov- 
ernments are forming with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. It only was 
informed of their treaty, and only after its approval, did they start the 
fight. The Russian diplomacy is holding the allies, so to speak, on 
a rope. They receive their instructions from it, and obtain from it 
their pass word. But the Russian diplomacy has wavered consider- 
ably since the beginning of the hostilities. In a communicative mo- 
ment, the French Ambassador in Berlin did not deny to me, how diffi- 
cult it was to count upon the highly able but inconsistent politicians, 
who are guiding the Empire associated with France, for they played 
a double game even with himself. Monsieur Cambon complained, 
especially of the influence, which Iswolsky had maintained because 
he wants to revenge himself personally on Austro-Hungary, and takes 
pains to spoil the game if it appears that she is winning it. 

^BEYENS. 

. No. 103. 

Berlin, April 4. 1913. 
Baron Beyens. 

From the European viewpoint the incident of Scutari is, no doubt, 
the most serious one since the opening of hostilities in the Balkans. It 

59 



is readily understood that the King of Montenegro persistently resists 
against the demands of Austro-Hungary and against the pressure 
exerted by the Powers. In view of his military mishaps, his crown 
is at stake ; the only chance, then, he has to keep it, is by means of an 
internal revolution, which will very likely be the possible result of the 
desperation in which his subjects will find themselves if he becomes 
in their eyes a victim of the Austro-Hungarian policy. Without the 
help of the Servians he cannot continue the siege of Scutari. But now 
the arrogance and contempt with which these receive the complaints 
of the Vienna Cabinet, can only be explained by the support which 
they believe to find in St. Petersburg. The Servian Charge D'Affairs 
said here recently, that his Government had not gone forward for six 
months without bothering itself about the Austrian threats if it had 
not been encouraged by the Russian Ambassador, Monsieur von 
Hartwig, a diplomat of the School of Iswolsky. 

The Russian policy displays a hesitancy which renders the Euro- 
pean situation particularly difficult. Monsieur Sazonov is at heart, in 
concord with his colleagues who are guiding the policy of the powers, 
but he feels that his influence with the Czar is being undermined by 
the Court party and the pan-Slavists. Hence the contradictions in 
his attitude. 

There is no doubt, that one is tired of those counter moves in 
Paris, but one tolerates if even with maledictions, the consequences 
of the alliance, and permits oneself to be forced upon a road which pos- 
sibly may lead to a general war. 

In Berlin one is not particularly edified about the direction which 
the Vienna Cabinet has given to the Triple Alliance in the Balkan 
question, but one displays a better attitude and looks cold bloodedly 
into the face of the complications which might arise from it. 

BEYENS. 

No. 104 

Paris, April 16, 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

There are not as yet any exact details about the incidents at 
Nancy (mistreatment of Germans by the French populace) and, espe- 
cially, r^ot about the one at the Casino — a resort of the third rank — 
where the quarrel began and where a performance under the title 
"The Ulan" had been played. That kind of show should not be per- 
mitted to be played. 

The afifair, which really has no significance, will doubtless be 
pushed aside, but it is, as the Minister told me, serious insofar as it 
proves how influenced the minds are on both sides. 

Even with us. Monsieur Pichon continued, there dominates a 
Chauvinism which is further developing, and which, I regret and 
against which one will have to battle. In half of the Parisian theatres 
nationalistic and chauvinistic pieces are now being played. I do not 
go to see them, but it is not sufificient; one should have the means 
of preventing the production of such plays. It depends upon bringing 
the minds again into a more tranquil condition. 

GUILLAUME. 

60 



No. 105 

Paris, April 17, 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

One does not know as yet what the final results of the investiga- 
tion in Nancy about the German-French incidents will be. The nu- 
merous correspondence which the newspapers are publishing are 
creating the impression that the facts have not sufficient significance 
to justify the raising of the shield by a part of the German press or 
the words of the Under-Secretary of State in the Berlin Parliament. 
But, doubtless, these facts will also prove and whereof I have had 
several times the honor to report to you that the public opinion in 
France is becoming more and more chauvinistic and heedless. One 
should take measures to stem this current which the government has 
truly encouraged since the incidents of Agadir and the formation of 
the Cabinet Poincare-Millerand-Delcasse. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 106 

Berlin, May 26, 1913. 
Baron Beyens. 

This report concerns only the marriage of the Princess Victoria 
Louisa with Prince Ernest August, Duke of Brunswick-Lueneburg 
and its political consequences. It is unimportant in the present Euro- 
pean complications and therefore omitted. 

No. 107 

Paris, June 13, 1913. 
Baron Guillaume. 

The newspapers have announced that the Ministerial Council 
has concluded to ask the Chamber of Deputies to accord special ses- 
sions for the discussion of the Military Law, the acceptance of which, 
it is determined, to secure before the Parliament adjourns. It is 
now also positive that certain laws will be introduced into the French 
statutes which the country will, very likely, not be able to stand for 
very long. The burdens of the new law will be so heavy for the 
people, the expenses which it brings with itself will be enormous, 
that the country will soon protest against it, and France will then 
have to face the question : either to relinquish what she will not be 
able to stand or to go to war within the briefest of time. For those 
who have brought the people into this situation, it will be a heavy 
responsibility. One follows them in a sort of headlessness, of in- 
teresting but regrettable insanity. Upon the danger of being accused 
of high treason, it is forbidden to-day, only to doubt the necessity 
of a three years' service. The propaganda in favor of the law for 
a three years' service through which a return of chauvinism is to 
be brought about, has been excellently prepared and carried out ; it 
began with promoting the election of Monsieur Poincare to the presi- 
dency of the Republic; it is, to-day, continuing its work without 
troubling itself about the dangers which it evokes ; the discomfort 
in the country is great. 

GILLAUME. 

61 



No. 108 

London, November 7, 1913. 
Count Lalaing. 

Sir Edward Grey made a speech in New Castle about the duties 
of a Minister of Foreign Affairs which should have four cardinal 
points in view : 

1. All political changes or combinations which might endanger 
the external safety of the country should be avoided. 

2. The territorial possessions of the country, which already were 
large enough, should not be increased, and it would be necessary to 
restrict oneself to guard England's possessions and to develop them. 

3. The British Commerce, above all, should be promoted by the 
avoidance of a war. 

4. The influence of the Nation should be utilized in promoting 
the humanitarian endeavors of the world. 

Practically all of these requirements may be interpreted in the 
following manner : 

1. The Minister stands for the maintenance of the Triple Entente. 

2. He does not favor any policy of conquest which might provoke 
the disapproval of the great competitors of England. 

3. He desires to promote the economic expansion of the country 
under exclusion of the care of international entanglements ; that is, 
he wants to maintain as friendly relations with Germany as possible. 

4. He does not relinquish the intention of using England's pres- 
tige and influence for the promotion of humanitarian endeavors toward 
other nations, probably above all, toward the weaker States. 

This dangerous and stretchable formula should please the philan- 
thropic party, so powerful in this country, and yet leave the door 
open for interventions which are often unjustified and provoke bit- 
terness. What duplicity. 

LALAING. 

No. 109 

London, Dec. 13, 1913. 
Count Lalaing. 

Recoimts only the fall of the Cabinet of Barthou in Paris, and 
is omitted as not bearing on the issue. 

No. 110 

Paris, Jan. 16, 1914. 
Baron Guillaume. 

It seems to me that we should have more concern in seeing the 
policy of Monsieur Cailloux — the Radicals and radical Socialists — 
successful. I have already had the honor of reporting to you that it 
had been Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand and their friends who had 
invented and followed the nationalistic, militaristic and chauvinistic 
policy, the re-establishment of which we have confirmed. It repre- 
sents a peril for Europe — and for Belgium. Therein I see the greatest 
danger, which menaces to-day the peace of Europe, not as if I was 
justified in the assumption that the French Government intended pur- 

62 



posely to disturb the peace — I rather believe the contrary — but be- 
cause the attitude of the Cabinet of Barthou has, in my opinion, 
evoked an increase of militaristic tendencies in Germany. 

The war lust of Turkey, and the law for the three years' service, 
appear to me to form the only dangers which menace the peace of 
Europe. I believe I am able to demonstrate the dangers which are 
embodied in the present army legislation of the Republic. France, 
which is enfeebled by the falling ofif of the birth rate, will not be 
able to carry for long the system of the law of three years' service. 
The effort is too great, not only from the financial, but also the per- 
sonal viewpoint. Such an efifort France will not be able to support, 
and what will she do to extricate herself from the difficult situation 
in which she will find herself? 

Monsieur Cailloux, who is really the Premier, is leaning toward 
an rapproachment to Germany, as is well known. He knows his 
country excellently and realizes that — with the exception of the 
political leaders, a handful of chauvinists and a few people who do 
not wish to confess their thoughts and tendencies — the majority of 
the Frenchmen, peasants, merchants, industrials — only reluctantly 
bear the excessive expenditures and personal burdens which are im- 
posed upon them. 

GUILLAUME. 
No. Ill 

Berlin, Feb. 20, 1914. 
Baron Beyens, 

The German-French understanding in regard to Asia Minor, 
which was concluded quite recently after difficult transactions, and, 
thanks to the personal intervention of the Chancellor in Berlin, se- 
cures to France a very considerable sphere of activity and influence 
in Syria. 

I asked the French Ambassador whether the agreement in Asia 
Minor, which had been so earnestly desired by the Emperor, as I 
had the honor to report to you, would, in his opinion, contribute in 
bettering the German-French relations. "The official relations per- 
haps to a certain extent." answered Monsieur Cambon, "but I do not 
believe that this understanding Avill have any influence upon the feel- 
ings of the great public of both sides of the Voges (?). The language 
of the French press toward the Germans will, unfortunately, not ex- 
perience any change thereby. Since the Dreyfous affair, we have in 
France also a militaristic and nationalistic party which does not, 
at any price, desire a better understanding with Germany and which 
strengthens a large part of the press in its aggressive tone. The 
government would have to reckon with the press and the party, whose 
mouth-piece it is, in case a serious incident should occur again be- 
tween the two nations. Incontestably the majority of the Germans 
and Frenchmen desire to live in peace, but in both countries there 
is a powerful minority which dreams only of battles and fights for 
conquests and revenge. Therein lies the danger, alongside of which 
one must live as alongside a powder keg, whose explosion may be 
effected by some imprudence or other. 

BEYENS. 

63 



No. 112 

Paris, March 10, 1914. 
Baron Guillaume. 

Baron Guillaume at first speaks of the tour of inspection which 
the President of the Republic is required to make of the various de- 
partments of France. He further relates how much the President is 
liked in all parts of the country and how he receives calls which are 
flattering to him and which are useful to his policies. Baron Guil- 
laume also states that the fall of Barthou's Cabinet had been painful 
to the President, because it had been clear to him, that his own 
person had been meant by it. The circumstances which forced him 
to place the power into the hands of Monsieur Cailloux have greatly 
displeased him. The personality of the Minister of Finance, whose 
merits he knows as well as his weaknesses, is highly antipathetical 
to him. He sees therein a failure in the militaristic and nationalistic 
policy, which he has systematically followed since the day on which 
he was placed as Premier at the head of the Government. 

Together with Monsieur Delcasse, Millerand and a few others, 
he has, unceasingly, preached of the political and military re-estab- 
lishment of France in conjunction with the creation of closer and 
more intimate relations with Russia. As President of Ministry he 
went to St. Petersburg, and in a few months he will return there as 
President of the Republic. He recently sent Monsieur Delcasse there 
with the mission of emphasizing with all means at command the 
benefits of a French-Russian Alliance and to influence the great Em- 
pire for the enlargement of its military preparations. 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 113 

Berlin, April 24, 1914. 
Baron Beyens. 

The press as well as the political circles of Berlin have neces- 
sarily been occupied with the visit of the English Sovereign Pair 
to Paris, and it needed nothing less than the latest events in Mexico 
to draw their attention away from this spectacle. One found here 
. . . how crude the efforts of certain French publicists had been in 
their aim to influence the British Government to transform the "En- 
tente Cordiale" into a real alliance ; both the liberal as well as the 
conservative Berlin journalists recorded their discomfiture with un- 
disguised joy. 

Monsieur Cambon sees again the hand of Iswolsky in this use- 
less campaign of the Russian and French newspapers. Iswolsky 
is again in great favor in St. Petersburg, as is apparent from the high 
distinction he received with the ribbon of the Alexandernewski Order, 
but in Paris he does not possess the ear of the Radical Cabinet. 
The French Ambassador in Berlin, therefore, hopes that the intriguing 
diplomat will soon represent the Czar in London. 

For the most interesting question, which arises on account of 
the visit of the English Sovereigns, is to know whether the British 
Government would be just as much disposed, as three years ago, 
to stand by France in case of a conflict with Germany. We had the 

64 



proof for it that the collaboration of the English Army and the dis- 
patch of an expeditionary corps to the Continent had been kept in 
view by the Military authorities of both countries. Will it be to- 
day just the same and must we still continue to fear that English 
soldiers will march into Belgium in order to assist us in the defense 
of our neutrality by thus compromising it from the start? 

If the question is only weighed from the German viewpoint, 
which is the only one that I could entertain, a negative answer is 
not doubtful. To any observer living in Berlin it has the appearance 
as if the voratious within the "Entente Cordiale" had been somewhat 
slackened, as if the point of the defensive weapon was no longer ex- 
clusively aimed at Germany, as it had been in the time of King Ed- 
ward, and, as if the "Triple Entente" was rather a concert than a 
treaty of powers, which act together in certain well defined ques- 
tions, in the pursuit of common interests. But this viewpoint may 
be wrong, or may be influenced by political writings which originate 
from German pens. It would be interesting for me to know what 
my colleagues in London and Paris think of the character which 
the "Entente Cordiale" has assumed. 



No. 114 



BEYENS. 



Paris, April 25, 1914. 



Baron Guillaume. 

Baron Guillaume merely remarks on the visit of the King and 
Queen of England to Paris and that this visit had been very success- 
ful, because everything had been auspicious in bringing about the 
warmest manifestations of sympathy. "These manifestations, so 
Baron Guillaume interprets, were devoted, especially, to the prin- 
ciples of the "Entente Cordiale" and found particular nourishment 
in the Nationalism, not to say Chauvinism, which the leaders of the 
nation had explained so as to enforce the principle of the crushing 
law. about the three years' military service with all of its personal, 
economic and financial consequences. 

The circumstances which Emperor Nicholas choose this moment 
to confer a high distinction upon the Russian Ambassador in Paris 
under significant comments, completes the international character 
of the Parisian manifestations in honor of King George. 

GUILLAUME. 



Baron Guillaume. 



No. 115 

Paris, May 8, 1914. 



Yesterday I had an opportunity of speaking with a Parisian 
who knows the international situation the best; he told me: "The 
visit of the King and Queen of England has succeeded completely, 
the sun participated in the celebration, and the French love to in- 
augurate demonstrations and to shout: 'Long live the King.' They 
prepared, therefore, a really hearty welcome for their guests, but I 
doubt that these demonstrations will change the policies of the two 

65 



countries in the least. The toast of King George was palpably less 
hearty than that of Monsieur Poincare." 

Of what character are the obligations which bind the two states 
together; have they concluded a military combination? I don't know, 
but I do not forget that thinking and sober heads doubt that France 
would find assistance from the Englishmen on the day of a European 
conflagration. There are even people who do not believe in serious 
support by England at sea. Furthermore, England does not cease 
coquetting with Germany. I have not been able to find out what 
has become of the German-English transactions about Angola and 
Mosambique. 

Incontestably, the French nation has become more chauvinistic 
and self-conscious in these last few months. The same understand- 
ing and professional people, who two years ago expressed the most 
vital apprehensions upon the mere mentioning of possible difficulties 
between France and Germany, are singing to-day quite a different 
tune ; they claim to be sure of victory, and make much to do of the 
really existing progress which the French Army has made, and con- 
tend that they will be able to hold the German Army in check long 
enough to give Russia time for mobilization, to concentrate her troops 
and then to fall upon her western neighbor. I do not believe that 
either of the two countries earnestly desire to risk the horrible game 
of war, but with the character of the French people, it is always to 
be feared that any incident under unfortunate representation may lead 
the people or, rather, the most nervous and lowest elements of the 
populace, into a situation which would make a war unavoidable. An 
experienced and highly placed diplomat said recently : "If right now 
there was to occur suddenly some serious incident between France 
and Germany, the statesmen of both countries would have to find 
an amicable solution within the next three days or there will be 
war. 

The most dangerous moment in the immediate situation is the 
return in France to the law of the three years' service. It was friv- 
olously railroaded through, but the country is not able to bear it. 
Within two years it will have to be abolished or war will have to be 
made." 



No. 116 



GUILLAUME. 



Paris, Tune 9, 1914. 



Baron Guillaume. 

The press campaign in favor of the principle of the three years'' 
service has been, during the past few days, extraordinarily vehement; 
all methods have been employed to influence public opinion and 
even the attempt to compromise the personality of General Joffre 
had been made. We have also seen the French Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, contrary to all precedents, take an initiative, which is an 
exceedingly dangerous one for the future of France. 

Is it true that the Cabinet in St. Petersburg has driven the country 
into the acceptance of the law for the three years' service, and is, 
to-day, demanding with all its force, its maintenance? 

66 



I have not succeeded in being enlightened on this ticklish point, 
but it would be so much more serious in significance, as the men, 
who guide the destiny of the Czar's Empire, must know, that the 
imposed effort is too great for the French people and that it cannot 
last very long. Is the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg per- 
haps based upon the conviction, that events are near enough to utilize 
the instruments which it desires to place in the hands of its allies? 

GUILLAUME. 

No. 117 

London, June 11, 1914. 
Count Lalaing. 

On the 8th of this month I had the honor of reporting to you 
the unrest which the recent ministerial crisis in France has produced 
here. The formation of the Cabinet Ribot has, therefore, been re- 
ceived with great satisfaction, for one is of the opinion that the Re- 
public will only be placed in position to satisfy the obligations which 
bind her to her Russian ally or her English friend by the application 
of the law of the three years' service. The French patriotism, which 
one does not want to question, has now the word ; party entanglements, 
must recede behind the higher interests of the nation. 

LALAING. 

No. 118 

Berlin, June 12, 1914. 
Baron Beyens. 

In view of the spectacle which France is offering, it appears 
to-day, as if the Cabinet Barthou had expected too much from the 
strength and feeling of the country when it demanded the re-estab- 
lishment of the three years' service, and as if the Germans were right 
to believe this. The French people did not display on this occasion 
the patriotic sacrifice of which it had given proof on other occasions. 
That is undoubtedly due to the spread of socialistic ideas among the 
lower strata of the nation. However it may be, the question must 
arise whether the Cabinet and the President of the Republic have 
not acted hastily, whether they had not been badly informed in re- 
gard to the real intentions of the Imperial Government when it sub- 
mitted last year the law providing for an army increase, and whether 
they did right in responding, move by move, with the law of the 
three years' service, instead of assuring themselves that the strength- 
ening of the German effective signified actually a weapon pointed at 
France. I have come to the conclusion that, as von Bethmann- 
Holweg announced from the speakers' platform in the Reichstag, the 
danger of a Balkan alliance, which later on could cripple a large part 
of the Austrian strength, had been the main reason for the German 
law of 1913. A few weeks after the promulgation of that law, the 
Balkan Alliance had ceased to exist, but the Imperial Government 
found itself in a new and unsuspected danger : the introduction of a 
law for the increase of the active strength of the French Army, to 
which a vehement campaign of speeches and newspaper articles 
against Germany had attached itself. The result of this excitement 

67 



which the Frenchmen displayed was a greater tension in the rela- 
tion to the neighboring Empire and the birth of the idea that the 
war would be inevitable in the near future because France desired 
it earnestly and was feverishly arming herself to be prepared for it. 

Paris is accusing the Imperial Government of the same inten- 
tions; several of the members of the latter have really used, now 
and then, unfortunate expressions as, for instance, the Minister of 
War, with his words, "lightning-like oflFensive and unsuspected at- 
tack," to secure the victory of the Germany Army. Perhaps even 
to-day it is only a horrible mutual mistake of both nations. The 
majority of the French people certainly do not want war, and Ger- 
many does not want this war. In a few years there will be no bal- 
ance of power possible between her and her neighbor. Germany only 
needs patience, only needs to increase in peace lastingly her economic 
and financial power, only needs to await the effects of the surplus 
of her birth rate, to reign, without contradiction and without combat, 
over the whole of Central Europe. 

Barthou and Poincare would, therefore, have perhaps done bet- 
ter to examine the question more cold-bloodedly, whether there would 
not have been better means to guard the peace between France and 
Germany than this race of armament and increase of active strength, 
the burdens of which the former is less able to carry for any length 
of time than the latter. 

Another point which might be brought against the adherents of 
the three years' service in France is the constant intervention of 
Russia into the debate over this internal question — Russia, whose 
political aims remain obscure, which utilizes the double alliance for 
her exclusive benefit and which also increased her armament in an 
alarming manner, without being menaced by Germany! 

As far as it concerns us, we need not be partisan — as, unfortu- 
nately, our French press is — for or against the maintenance of the 
three years' service by our neighbors. But we may put the following 
question before us: Would not the victory of the Radical party 
over the moderate Republicans, which are surrounding the President 
of the Republic, and the subsequent sacrifice of the military law of 
the Cabinet Barthou, be exceedingly favorable events for us? For 
they would contribute more than anything else, not only to keep 
away the dangers of a war from our frontier, the consequences of 
which we would have to fear, no matter what the outcome may be, 
but also to create again a secure situation in the west of Europe. 

BEYENS. 

No. 119 

Berlin, July 2, 1914. 
Baron Beyens. 

The news that the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade had been 
instructed to demand of the Servian Government an investigation of 
the anarchistic machinations to which the Arch Duke, Francis Ferdi- 
nand, and the Duchess of Hohenberg had fallen victims, and to permit 
the Austro-Hungarian police agents to participate in the investiga- 
tions, has caused a certain unrest in the diplomatic circles of Berlin. 

68 



The fact that this decision of directing this demand to the Cabinet 
of Belgrade had been formulated upon a conference between the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff, Konrad von Hoetzendorff and the Minister of War, Kro- 
batin, furnishes still more food for the comments, which the news 
had evoked. One must certainly draw into consideration the incense 
which the crime, the confessions of the murderers about the origin 
of their bombs, which had been sent from Belgrade, as well as the 
inconsiderate language of some of the papers of that capital, had 
produced in Vienna; they endeavored to justify the crime by repre- 
senting it as a merited punishment for the suppression which the 
Servian elements and the Servian National feeling had to suffer in 
Bosnia. The Cabinet Paschitch, which closed its eyes so as not to 
see the source of the anarchistic propaganda in Belgrade, must not 
be surprised if an energetic proceeding against the culprits is de- 
manded of it, instead of treating them still further with blind patience. 
But, nevertheless, the demand exceeds the usual principles of right. 
If a state consents upon the request of a foreign government to 
proceed against criminals in its own territory, it entrusts its own 
employees with the investigations. Will Servia consent to the col- 
laboration of the Austro-Hungarian Police officials? If she rejects 
it as an infringement of her sovereign rights, will then arise a con- 
flict which, in consideration of the justifiable anger of the govern- 
ments in Vienna and Budapest and in consideration of the Anti- 
Servian manifestations in a few cities of the Monarchy, may lead 
to hostilities. 

In Berlin it is said that Servia would let it come that far only 
if she felt herself supported by Russia, but the Czar's Government 
would not sustain her, for she herself would have to share the abhor- 
rence and the fear which the crime of the regicides from Sarajerro 
had evoked. 

BEYENS. 



69 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



018 499 954 7 • 

'^1 



TWO INTERESTING STATEMENTS 

No. 1 — Statement of Judge Anderson: 

Boston, January 12, 1920. — ^Judge George W. Anderson, of the 
United States District Court, told the Harvard Liberal Club tonight 
that, as United States District Attorney, he was charged with a 
large responsibility as to protecting the community from pro-German 
plots. He asserted as to his best judgment that more than ninety- 
nine per cent of the pro-German plots never existed. 

No. 2— President Wilson on September 5, 1919, speaking in St. Louis, 
stated as follows : 

"Why, my fellow citizens, is there any man here, or any woman, 
let me say, is there any child here, who does not know that the seed 
of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? 
The reason why the war wie have just finished took place was that 
. Germany was afraid that her commercial rivals were going to get 
the better of her, and the reason why some nations went inJ;o the 
war against Germany was that they thought Germany would get the 
commercial advantage of them. The seed of the deep-seated hatred 
wasfhot, commercial and successful rivalry. . . . This war, in its 
inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political 
war," • ' . 



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